The report opens with a discussion of alternatives. Examining the spectrum of political possibilities, Smithies resembles a man who has lost all but his most peripheral vision. He simply cannot see straight ahead. From the corner of his right eye he observes that "military security may be sufficient to permit the economy to operate under market forces and to be oriented toward the world economy with respect both to trade and the use of foreign capital." Sneaking a glance toward the left, he recoils at the sight of "full incorporation in the economy of North Vietnam," an arrangement leaving "little doubt that the South would be exploited by the North."

Smithies proceeds "on the assumption that the first alternative, which is clearly preferable, is also feasible." He is unable to envision a coalition government somewhere in between, a government that would combine collectivist holding patterns with a non-Communist framework.

Did Smithies make these political assumptions himself or did he act on specifications prepared by the IDA? That is one of the unanswered questions. Smithies refused to talk on the record: "I don't try to get into political controversy," he said. Probably he chose to posit a rightwing political administration, largely because that is the contingency he is academically equipped to handle. But the question misses the point. When the IDA gave him the contract, it knew the sort of work he was likely to do. That was the sort of work it wanted.

The American government has been interested in Smithies' work for a long time. In April 1969 students occupying University Hall opened the files of then Dean of the Faculty Franklin L. Ford and found a letter from Arthur Smithies. Dated December 7, 1967, the letter read: "The Central Intelligence Agency has instructed its consultants to inform their official superiors of this connection with the Agency. I hereby inform you of my connection of ten years duration. I wish I could add that there is something subtly interesting or sinister about it." On the bottom Ford scrawled, "Acknowledge, Should we have a little confidential file on such relationships outside personal folders?"

A continuing consultant with the IDA under contract with the Vietnam Bureau of the Agency for International Development (AID), Smithies frequently visits Vietnam. He was in Saigon this summer. Author of several reports not intended for publication, he is now working on a State Department project based at the Columbia School of International Affairs (CSLA).

The Columbia project has a new twist: contingency planning. It will study the possible role of multilateral machinery in the economic rehabilitation of North and South Vietnam, and it will "analyze alternative local political conditions within which any international program might have to work."

Ruth B. Russell, research associate at the CSLA, is the researcher who is coordinating the project. Her field of academic interest is multilateral agencies. Allan E. Goodman, an assistant professor at Clark University and a former Harvard graduate student, will consider political possibilities. Smithies will examine "the order of magnitude of the overall requirement for external assistance" and the probable willingness of different sources to contribute to a multilateral aid program.

Both Goodman (in the April Asian Survey) and Smithies have written recently about topics closely related to the ones they are now studying. The contract took affect June 15 and the final report is due March 1. The budget is a meager $42.935, with only $2000 chalked for travel. Smithies said he has not yet begun his part of the report.

The modest amounts of time and money allocated to this project suggest that it will not be of major significance. The fact that two of the three principals have recently completed similar research suggests that they will present rehashed versions of their work for this report. Surely the State Department could have used its own people to present a coherent document.

So why did it bother with Columbia?

Russell said that she is doing the project because of her interest in international organization. "The question is now how much money you want, but how much can you get, and how do you mobilize international resources," she said. "How much can you get the international community to mobilize, and what is the effect of the political conditions in Vietnam?"

But while she was clear on her own motivation, Russell could only guess about State's. "The reason why various people in the State Department might have found our proposals of interest probably varies with each of the people," she remarked. "Even Mr. Nixon probably has multiple motivations regarding the situation over there."

When asked why the State Department should go to Columbia rather than write an in-house report, Russell seemed annoyed. "I'm quite sure they have people capable of doing it, but they have a lot of other things to do," she snapped.

Thomas Judd, Senior Program Officer of the Division of External Research of the State Department and the officer supervising the project said, "Our primary purpose is to see if anybody on the outside has ideas on reconstruction of Vietnam, especially the multilateral thing."

Judd agreed that the people involved in the project--in particular, Smithies and Goodman--have already done similar work. "We need people with the right background who have done thinking in this area," he said. "They don't have to get out with the plow and plow up the ground all over again.