The Chinese remain sober about the prospects for renewed relations with America. They sense Nixon might offer very little but remain cautiously optimistic. They claim that whatever the outcome, they are willing to talk. Such a cavalier stance hides many of their expectations.

With the Cultural Revolution safely behind them and domestic stability restored, Chou now stands ready to tackle foreign policy problems. Diplomatic isolation since the Sino-Soviet split has left China with few allies and little flexibility. While Mao's "hard-line" boosted morale, China could do little to help allies materially. Last Spring's slaughter in East Pakistan seriously hurt the credibility of the Chinese position that they would not behave as a superpower. China adopted a policy based on national interest over revolutionary ideology in letting their allies, West Pakistan, crush a popular rebellion. As China saw the alternative, a split Pakistan would have meant an Indian advance, pushing for an All-Bengalese state. With India so closely allied to Russia, China could not allow their "number one threat" to gain such a foothold. The Chinese have also been forced to adopt such a stand against popular rebels in Ceylon.

America also views dimly any strengthening of Russia's hold in Pakistan and India where America's interests are as deeply involved as anywhere. Members of the Nixon team have openly indicated that they expect America to gain considerable bargaining advantages over Russia due to China's reentry on the world scene. For example Russia eased considerably its stand over Berlin in signing the new agreement this summer. And now Nixon feels he can gain new terms with the Russians by a trip to Moscow next May.

The Chinese, looking into the future, see Japan looming up as a superpower. They recognize that any weakening of the American position in Asia, particularly in Vietnam and Taiwan (both areas they feel America has all but lost) will spur increased militarism in Japan.

The Chinese, in short, are hoping that a strong international bargaining position will increase their diplomatic mobility. With America also becoming increasingly concerned over Japan's status as a superpower and domestic economic threat, the Chinese will find much common interest with America in dealing with Japan and Russia. These power politics matrices dominate Kissinger's thinking and Nixon's foreign policy.

But as the Chinese battle their way out of isolation, it must be noted that negotiations will take second place in the long run to domestic and international socialist solidarity. While they hope negotiations will succeed, they absolutely hold to their position that the capitalist world will inevitably attack. This theory, so firmly stressed in their split with Khruschev in the late fifties and early sixties, necessitates continued preparedness for war. As part of the reconstruction after the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese have strengthened the decentralized militias and have built underground bomb shelters in all the cities.

Serious unanswered questions remain regarding prospects for the normalization of relations. Is Nixon serious about negotiating on Taiwan and withdrawing from Vietnam? Or is this another P.R. type for next year's elections, diverting public attention away from Nixon's failure to stop the war? And if Nixon is serious, will the Pentagon go along or will they pull another U-2 or Gulf of Tonkin type adventure to force his hand?

The negotiations will focus on the crucial Taiwan and Vietnam problems. Chou En-lai demands unequivocal sovereignty over Taiwan and abandonment of America's presence on Chinese soil. Chou will remain no less adamant in his support for Hanoi and his refusal to dictate a settlement. Nixon must face these central realities of China's foreign policy. If he expects to negotiate seriously, America must abandon its illegitimate presence in Taiwan.