MacEwan added that "the DAS reinforced the creation of the present totalitarian government in West Pakistan. It was one of many forces working in that direction."

Gustave Papanek refused to comment on the role of the DAS in the development of Pakistan, but John W. Thomas, current associate director of the DAS, agreed with many of the points voiced by MacEwan and other DAS critics.

Thomas, who worked in East Pakistan for the DAS, called its role "peripheral," adding that "the DAS did not have final responsibility for the development policy, but we did agree with that policy." Thomas conceded however that events in Pakistan have proved that the elitist theory of development "is pretty unsatisfactory."

He agreed that the DAS has been slow in realizing its errors. "The DAS did not recognize what was happening to Pakistan in the late sixties, or did not get sufficiently upset about it," he said.

Thomas admitted that the policy of protecting and subsidizing the rich to promote growth through reinvestment had failed in Pakistan. "There was a great deal of conspicuous consumption in the country," he said. "The reinvestment strategy did not have the desired effects."

Thomas acknowledged that DAS policy faces major reappraisals and alterations: "The tragic situation in Pakistan has changed development thinking substantially."

He vowed that in the future the DAS will pay more attention to income distribution figures rather than relying solely on the GNP as an index of development progress. He added that "we are starting to recognize the political implications of economic growth."

He cited the employment of a Yugoslav economist in the current DAS project in Peru as an example that, "in the future, it will not be unheard of for us to support socialism."

Arthur MacEwan was skeptical that even a tragedy of immense proportions like Pakistan would be enough to change the dominant development ideology epitomized by the DAS. "In the future, the DAS errors will not be as gross, but there will be no fundamental change," he predicted.

MacEwan added that "the DAS policy in Pakistan was not a mistake, but a logical outgrowth of their ideology and values."

It is clear that an immense human tragedy is presently being enacted in Bangla Desh. It is also clear that there is nothing inevitable about the genocide in Bangla Desh; it is the logical culmination of a series of human decisions.

Perhaps expectedly, the primary villain in the tragedy is the American state. Under the guise of preventing 'Communist bloc' expansion, American imperialism uses military aid to prop up totalitarian regimes around the globe. That the client regimes remain subservient to U.S. hegemony is the only condition that must be met before the aid is provided. This American weaponry is currently being used against the people of Bangla Desh.

But there are lesser villains in the cast of characters, villains who were often unwitting. The DAS appears to fit into this latter characterization. It would be far from accurate to term the men of the DAS as slavering imperialists. They are well-meaning men who have labored in the far corners of the globe, but they have worn ideological blinders that have prevented them from realistically assessing the problems of developing nations. One hopes that Arthur MacEwan is wrong and that future development policies in the other DAS projects will change dramatically. One hopes that the Pakistan experience will teach the DAS that the elitist route to development is actually a frightening detour.

A final example that summarizes the wrongheadedness of the DAS' planning strategy in Pakistan can be found in the preface to Gustave Papanek's Pakistan's Development. Papanek thanks the "300 industrialists and government officials" he contacted for their cooperation and assistance in helping him to write the book. Hopefully, books about future DAS projects will also contact the mass of the people before lauding the success of a development policy