Peacekeeping. If the war is to be ended by a genuine negotiation (compared, for instance with a camouflaged surrender), it is hard to see how such a conclusion can be secured without the support of an international force presumably under the U.N. The security provided by such a force would clearly facilitate the process of development by reducing the uncertainties that would surround investment in an insecure situation. The flow of foreign capital into the country would be increased as well as the repatriation of capital by nationals.
Military Resistance. There seems little likelihood that any country besides the United States will provide military assistance to Vietnam. As it has in Korea, the U.S. will presumably have to continue such aid on a bilateral basis. Of course the more international peacekeeping there can be, the less the need for Vietnamese mobilization, with its attendant costs, there will be.
General Economic Support. So far the U.S. has provided virtually all the general support that Vietnam has received. A main beneficiary of the operation has been Japan, which has supplied most of the imports purchased by Vietnam with free dollars (obtained from the U.S. in exchange for piasters). In the name of equity in economics and polities. Japan should carry a major share of the aid burden in the future.
There is no regularly constituted international agency that could channel general support to Vietnam. The most suitable multinational arrangement would be a consortium of the types that have consolidated aid to India and stabilization aid to Laos. The members should include the U.S., Japan, Australia, Thailand, New Zealand, Korea and the Phillippines. But the club should not be exclusive. Canada, for instance, should be eligible for membership. The U.S. has been included in the list for realistic reasons. If the consortium would operate on an adequate scale without the U.S. so much the better.
Development Assistance. The Asian Development Bank is an obvious candidate for administering development assistance, especially since it is Asian in its orientation, and Japan is a major partner. There is one difficulty, however. The Bank supposedly selects worthwhile development projects regardless of country. It will be necessary to concentrate a special effort on Japan, which contradicts the Bank's policy. It may be possible to arrange for the Bank to act as trustee or agent in administering funds provided by countries, like the U.S. or Japan, that have special responsibilities for Vietnam.
The World Bank will of course have a role to play, and has already begun to cooperate with the U.N. in the Mekong. There is some doubt about whether these international agencies will be willing to operate on the scale required. While strenuous efforts whould be made to channel development aid through them, bilateral loans from the U.S., and hopefully. Japan will probably continue to be important.
Monetary Policy. The I.M.F. has twice played an important role with respect to the Vietnamese exchange rate. While it has lent its sanction to necessary devaluations, it has not sponsored the idea of exchange flexibility, which is essential so long as inflation remains endemic in Vietnam. It must be admitted that the fund's influence, so far, has not been entirely beneficial.
Technical Assistance. The contributions that the World Health Organization can make to Vietnam are self-evident. Not so obviously the U.N. Special Fund can make useful contributions, such as conducting a geological survey.
Labor and Welfare. As pointed out above, real wages in Vietnam have risen in relation to those of its neighbors. It would be premature for international organizations to promote higher labor or welfare standards in the immediate future