The 1965 war with India precipitated a vast economic setback in Pakistan, wrecking much of the growth that had occurred in the years before. More than that, it precipitated a political crisis that led ultimately to the bloody rioting and the fall of Ayub in 1968. But the new government was merely a political, not an economic, substitute for Ayub, the only real difference in its economic outlook being that it chose to reduce the DAS' influence in planning policy. It was for this reason that the DAS left Pakistan last June.

How did the DAS do wrong in Pakistan? Largely, of course, by linking itself to a government which wanted neither social reform nor the prolonged influence of would-be reformers within its own counsels. That is not to say that there were irreconcilable breaches of opinion between the field team and the government; in fact, both had agreed on the desirability of working within the bounds of a free-market economy during the earlier period. The important point, however is that when Avub curtailed the works program, the DAS was obliged to go along and continue advising him on the feasible alternatives simply because he was the man for whom they were working. He and the institutions surrounding him were the givens in the relationship; within that context, the DAS could advise and consult, but it could not reform.

AND YET the DAS continued to work with him. It did not take issue with him because its subservient relationship with the Pakistani government imposed unbreakable obligations of loyalty and confidentiality. Why, then, did they not break off the project there and then? If they were any more meaningful than cabinet-level clerks, would they not have done so? And if the DAS amounts to no more than a collection of highly skilled technicians, are its activities in six foreign countries the proper place for men who should be concerned with the very broadest possible issues of development?

The Indonesian episode poses largely the same questions. According to Gustav F. Papanek, who served for six years as DAS director, the Indonesian government is "one of the most self-assured and independent governments-in the economic sphere-that I know of. They'll use foreigners for advice on technical problems, but there's no question who runs the show."

The analogy with Ayub is staggering. In the words of Richard Gilbert, who also served as field director in Indonesia, "an army which was originally a guerilla army, an army of independence, has been converted and now behaves like an army of occupation." The hope of the Indonesian people for a better life after the overthrow of Sukaron's abusive political and economic policies has met with mass murders, political concentration camps, and massive American "aid" and investment. And where does the DAS stand among all this?