(The author is a graduate student in Russian History who worked this summer for Rep. Robert Kastenmeier [D-Wisc.], a member of the House Judiciary Committee.)

IN a televised news conference three months ago, President Nixon categorically denied that repression was a policy of the Administration. A few days later Attorney General Mitchell stated that fears of repression on the part of students and blacks was "more of that rhetoric." Whether there is a well-formulated policy of repression may be a moot question if many citizens believe it to be so and behave as if such a policy existed and if the government is carrying out activities which could be categorized as ad hoc repression. In the first few months of 1970, increasing frequency of reports concerning the snooping activities of various branches of government has lent credence to fears of a growing repressive apparatus. The disclosure that Internal Revenue Service agents have been checking cards in various libraries and the passage of the D. C. Crime Bill with its controversial no-knock and wiretapping provisions are only the most recent examples of such potentially-repressive activities.

The operations contained in the following summary do appear suppressive of the rights of privacy, freedom of speech and association, and are constitutionally dubious. Beyond this, the gathering of intelligence data; its computerization and storage in data banks by different branches of the government, by private firms, or by complexes such as the Cambridge Project, is a logical product of the bureaucratic and technological rationale for investigation, more information, and expertise. Whether the subject be the political behavior of Guatemalan peasants or Bolivian tin miners, the reaction to urbanization of South Vietnamese peasants or ghetto blacks, the rationale is that if only we had more Knowledge about the problem, if only data were quantifiable and immediately retrievable, then human behavior and events would be more predictable and thus more controllable. It is a logical extension of such thinking to maintain files on a growing number of American citizens whose personal information, ideas, and actions are deemed of interest to some organization or for reasons of "security."

The Department of the Army is certainly no newcomer to intelligence and surveillance operations. In the past, however, such operations have logically focused on the Army's military role abroad: no matter that dossiers have been kept on politically suspect South Vietnamese, at least American citizens were reasonably assured that their political activities were not under surveillance. Such is apparently no longer the case according to Christopher Pyle, formerly a captain in Army intelligence himself and presently a graduate student at Columbia. Writing in the Washington Monthly (January and July, 1970), Pyle documents the collection, computerization, storage, and analysis of purely domestic intelligence by the U. S. Army Intelligence Command under the official designation of "CONUS," the Army's acronym for Continental U. S. Begun in 1965, and greatly expanded after the summer riots of 1967, the CONUS operation maintains files on millions of Americans who may have been involved, however remotely or passively, in domestic political activity, however lawful. The operation functions under no specific authority from the Executive much less the Legislative branch.

PYLE DISCLOSED that the Army maintains a $2.7 million command post under the Pentagon parking lot. This so-called Directorate for Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations is a constant riot watch. Despite Army assurances that it has dismantled its computerized file system at Fort Holabird, Md., it still maintains 375 copies of a two-volume encyclopedia on dissent entitled "Counter-Intelligence Research Project," popularly known as the Compendium. This is compiled by the Counter-Intelligence Analysis Division at the Pentagon.

In addition, still functional are:

A computer-indexed, microfilm archive of intelligence reports, newspaper clippings, and other records of political protest and civil disturbances at the CIAD headquarters in Alexandria, Va.

Similar intelligence reports at Continental Army Command headquarters at Fort Monroe, Va.

Non-computerized regional data banks at stateside army commands and at military installations.

Non-computerized files at most of the 300 intelligence group offices of the Intelligence Command.

The input of these files consists of the reports of 1000 Army investigators and undercover agents in addition to "incident reports" which include police reports, newspaper clippings, and wire service reports collected in local field offices.

Included in the files is intelligence about civilians unconnected with the military; such intelligence could not be construed as necessary for personnel security. Data on civil disturbances and lawful and nonviolent meetings and lectures find their way to computers which can correlate trends and like incidents as well as compile lists of all incidents in which a particular individual has been involved. Alongside such perfunctory data such as names and addresses of leaders of organizations are data on the membership, ideology, program and practices of the organizations or groups.

The Army's justification for such domestic intelligence-gathering operations is its ultimate responsibility for domestic order should local or National Guard units be unable to keep the peace, as indeed happened in 1967 and 1968. If the Army may be called to assist in quelling riots, then it must have at its disposal relevant intelligence information to enable it to cope with the situation most effectively.

Granting the Army some claim to jurisdiction in these matters, several questions may be put which challenge the use or abuse of such jurisdiction. What are the guidelines in terms of categories of information kept on file? How important are subjective categories such as political convictions? What sort of political convictions are deemed subversive and therefore worthy of inclusion in the files? What limitations, if any, are placed on the access to these files? Could prospective employers or universities, say, retrieve data from the Army's files? What is the nature of the analysis which the data undergoes? Some of the data, it has been revealed, are kept in "raw form"; that is, enter the files from a police or investigator's report or from a newspaper clipping without any evaluation of its accuracy. Finally, it is logical to ask whether or not the individuals on file have any opportunity to correct or challenge the information kept about them?

The Army is not alone in its domestic intelligence operations, though its presence is perhaps the most unexpected. Other branches of government, particularly Justice and the Treasury, carry on similar activities. The Justice Department, for instance, maintains an even bigger computer in its "domestic war room" which is fed FBI intelligence reports in raw form. (One might here ask to what extent such information is obtained from wiretaps.) In addition Secret Service inputs data concerning threats to the President, information on demonstrations, abusive statements, and plans to embarrass government officials. Weekly computerized intelligence reports give a city-by-city assessment on the potential for civil disorder, indicating what marches, rallies, or meetings are occurring and the organizations or individuals sponsoring them, as well as the city's disturbance history. The books are read by the Interdivisional Information Unit which sends pertinent data to the Attorney General and various department divisions. Special reports were filed on the November 15 demonstration listing all the available stored intelligence on the individuals and organizations planning it. The Black Panthers also rate special reports.