* The removal of those rich-country protective barriers which lower the prices of the poor-country raw-material exports.

* An increase in foreign aid programs.

* The formation of common market trading units among developing countries.

To the United States, fighting to improve its own balance of payments by cutting back on imports on foreign aid, many of these demands will come hard. But there are a few encouraging signs. Before he left, Rostow--the American representative in New Delhi--announced a major change in American policy. After ten years of firm opposition, the U.S. will be willing to accept a system of preference treaties at the conference.

But, there will be conditions attached. The most important will be that Britain and France give up their system of "reciprocal preferences" with their former colonies.

Other demands seem certain to hit snags. Congress has cut foreign aid and has shown little inclination to lower trade barriers. And the abortive attempt to form a Latin American common market offers little encouragement on the score of cooperation among the poor nations.

On the whole the conference's prospects appear dubious. Unfortunately, a quiet failure in New Delhi may be more crucial in the long run than success in Saigon or Panmunjon.