Wars of National Liberation

The Chinese communists are the classic practitioners of successful guerrilla warfare. China was a country mired in social and economical injustice, with an impotent and corrupt government. Nevertheless, the Red Army was on the verge of destruction when the Japanese invasion in 1937 drove the Nationalist and warlord forces away and thus allowed the guerrillas to enter the villages not only as reformers but also as effective champions of nationalism in opposition to a foreign invader. Mao Tse-tung rode to victory on these two waves of support. It was foreign occupation of China and not some magic Maoist technique which was decisive.

Nationalism has been decisive in Vietnam too. Ho Chi Minh joined the Communists because only they treated him with respect and offered to help free Vietnam from the French. Ho has since written that "At first, patriotism, not Communism, led me to have confidence in Lenin." Without the status as national heroes which the Viet Minh earned by liberating their homeland from the French, and without the organization built up during that long struggle, the guerrillas could never have become the power which they are in Vietnam today.

Successful guerrilla-led revolutions, which the Administration insists on calling "wars of national liberation"--a communist term carrying the connotation of Chinese domination--are rare because all of the conditions necessary for their success seldom occur simultaneously. Such wars have succeeded only where the guerrillas have seized both the mantle of social revolutionary or reformer and that of nationalist hero who drove out the foreigner--as in Yugoslavia, China, Algeria and Vietnam. Where guerrillas have been unable to capture the banner of nationalism--either because of ethnic problems, as in Malaya, or because of the absence of a foreign invader, as in Burma and the Philippines--they have failed.

Revolutionary guerrillas are currently gaining strength in northeast Thailand. Their success came only after the large-scale U.S. military build-up there in 1965, not before. It is this massive U.S. military presence which may provide the guerrillas with a viable issue--removal of the omnipresent Yankees--on which they can unite the minority people of the northeast with the ethnic Thai majority in a revolutionary uprising.

But few underdeveloped countries are occupied by foreign powers. Thus the combination of special political and social conditions and foreign presence which is necessary for successful revolution of this type is virtually absent in today's world. In short, no matter how enthusiastic China may be about them or how much Washington may fear them, successful "wars of national liberation" are much, much less probable than the Administration tends to believe. Since particular local conditions are decisive, failure to defeat the guerrillas in Vietnam will not increase the number of instances in which success is possible. On the other hand, expansion of the military build-up beyond the borders of Vietnam may well create the conditions making for guerrilla success in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

The Administration believes that America's interests are best served by a world of independent nation-states. At the same time, the Administration claims that successful national liberation movements will readily fall under China's domination. But have not all successful "wars of national liberation," even when led by communists, produced governments singularly independent of neighboring great powers? Yugoslavia early broke with Russia. China's independence of Russia is beyond question. And North Vietnam has long been noted for its ability to balance Russia against China instead of being the puppet of China.

In summary, if guerrillas cannot capture a nationalist mantle, their prospects for success are minimal. In fact, with the exception of China and Vietnam, communists have been unable to seize control of nationalist movement anywhere in Asia or Africa. Therefore if guerrillas are successful, the nationalist governments which they establish need not conflict with America's vital interests; successful revolutionaries will insist on and maintain their independence of China and other powers.

War With China

The Administration insists that it is policy-makers in Hanoi who are primarily responsible for the continued fighting in the south, and that ever-increasing pressure must be applied to Hanoi until she gives up. But Hanoi sees herself as justly aiding her fellow countrymen, unjustly attacked by the United States. Therefore, Hanoi will not give in to the United States. Before surrendering, she will call in the aid of friendly nations.

Allen S. Whiting, now a prominent State Department specialist, has concluded that at the minimum, China entered the Korean War in order "to preserve an entity identifiable as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." There is every reason to believe that if American armies again threaten to destroy a buffer state allied with China--in this case, North Vietnam--Peking will not hesitate to intervene, even at the risk of provoking American bombing of the Chinese mainland.

Initially, the Administration seemed fully aware of the relevant parallel between Korea and Vietnam; it avoided movements of troops toward the 17th parallel and other acts which might threaten the destruction of the Hanoi government. Now, however, faced with Hanoi's stubborn resistance, and in light of the Administration's mistaken belief that victory in the "test case" of Vietnam can end this type of "aggression" in this century, U.S. policy has begun to develop a logic and momentum of its own. As each escalation fails both to break Hanoi's will and to provoke China's entry, the Administration first hopes, and then believes, that the next step may bring victory over Hanoi and yet not bring Chinese armies pouring into Vietnam.

Indeed, we now hear the President's advisors telling him--despite the compelling parallel of Korea--that "China will not intervene even if the North Vietnamese collapse." Just as in the case of Korea, it is easy to hope that it is impossible for China to intervene. She is preoccupied domestically, her army is poorly equipped by modern standards, she has no respectable air force or nuclear umbrella, and so on. These arguments were even more valid in 1950 than they are today. Nevertheless, China did intervene in Korea. Until recently, Washington was convinced that China would intervene if Hanoi collapsed; now Washington begins to doubt. But it is not China's policies or her national interests which have changed. What has changed is the Administration's need to rationalize more and more desperate policies. If continued, these policies will inevitably result in war with China.

Conclusion

This analysis shows that the potential of "wars of national liberation" has been overestimated. There will be few such successful wars. Where they are successful they will not automatically produce regimes inimical to vital U.S. interests or subservient to Chinese interests. However, prolonged American military involvement in Vietnam may well increase the likelihood of other successful "wars of national liberation." We further find that, in a desperate attempt to achieve what can only be a hollow victory in Vietnam, present U.S. policy is leading directly to war with China.

To avoid war with China, we advocate an end to the bombing of North Vietnam and a halt to escalation. However, given the Administration's present assumptions, it is doubtful whether an American President can resist the pressures toward escalation while American troops are fighting and dying in South Vietnam. For de-escalation to be lasting, we must begin by de-escalation in our minds. We must regain some perspective on the whole question of China and of revolutionary wars. Because our analysis has shown that a victory of the guerrillas in South Vietnam would not undermine vital American interests, we advocate the expeditious withdrawal of American troops from the area. We recognize, of course, that this American withdrawal would be only part of a broader political settlement.

POLITICAL SCIENCE Edward Friedman, Steven J. Levine, Richard M. Pfeffer

HISTORY Fox Butterfield, Edwards J.M. Rhoads, Eric Widmer

ECONOMICS Ralph Huenemann, Richard A. Kraus, Thomas G. Rawski

The authors of this statement are all doctoral candidates specializing in modern China. A number of our colleagues in East Asian studies at Harvard have shared the expense of this publication with us. For further information write Edward Friedman, 18 Mellen St., Cambridge, or John W. Dower, 52 Duff St., Watertown.