That expression of student attitudes which most reflects the failure of the communist regimes to show any real progress in building the "new socalist man" is the student aversion to becoming "involved"--ideologically, politically, or socially. This came out quite clearly in the Polish surveys in 1958 and 1961. The reported frequency of political discussions among students, for example, decreased markedly between 1958 and 1961. At the same time there was a rise from 30 to 40 percent of the sample who, in assessing students' attitudes toward socialism, considered "those who do not care about it" as constituting the prevalent group among undergraduates. Later Polish surveys show that students appear better informed on the activities of the major political parties in the United States, than with politics in Poland itself.

This unwillingness to become involved has been recognized and labelled by Soviet commentators as indifferentizm (indifference to things political, and a failure to conform to the party-defined values and patterns of thought). It expreses a desire on the part of many young people to be left alone, to be free from the constant exhortations and demands imposed by the party. "Many of our young people declare that they want to keep out of politics. They wouldn't need to bother with politics in the West, they say"--so complains the official organ of the East German youth organization, Junge Welt.

A survey by the local paper in an important provincial Hungarian city, Pecs, showed that there was considerable political apathy among the students in Pecs University. Attitudes of mistrust, cynicism, and even hostility to politics were found. Similar apolitical attitudes appeared in one of the surveys conducted by the Hungarian youth organization (KIST). In responding to the question of how they used their free time, students indicated that they preferred literature and the arts, young workers preferred television, sports, and dancing, and peasant youth occupied themselves with cards, bowling, and sessions at the village inn. There was no significant spontaneous devotion of free time to "building communism" or "productive work."

The Yugoslav survey previously cited provides an analysis of student attitudes which, with some modifications, might well be applicable to all of the communist countries of Eastern Europe. It distinguishes three groups of students according to their political behavior: 1) a not very numerous group of young enthusiasts, "who are exercising their desire to change social relations in a progressive [i.e., ideologically approved] direction through countless forms of concrete and just activity"; 2) a somewhat larger group characterized by "conformist adaptation," who give priority to their own personal interests; and 3) a much larger group whose political behavior is distinctly reserved. Within this latter group, which the author implicitly recognizes as the most significant, a further four-fold distinction of ascending size is made. First, a small group which is clearly politically and ideologically indifferent; second, those who concentrate their activity on their own technical training; third, the skeptics, the cynics, the nihilists; and finally, those who are politically reserved and resigned, but not to the extreme--who have a feeling of helplessness in the face of social forces.

This latter group has social and political views, but hesitate to express them, for its members do not see the possibility for "socio-political activity." For this reason they withdraw into narrow circles engaging in non-political activities (recreation, entertainment, and the like). In terms of the political socialization process in the communist countries, the persistence of youth and student attitudes other than those of the "young enthusiasts" in the first group mentioned above can be considered a setback to the regime. This forthright recognition by the Yugoslavs of the fact that the majority of their students do not measure up to the "ideal" is in itself a commentary on the changing nature of the Yugoslav regime.

There is also evidence of a generational conflict. Polish sources have admitted a strong feeling on the part of youth blaming the older generation for the war and the accompanying destruction, for the misery and unemployment, for the fear of a new war, for "senseless iron curtains and boundary barriers," and for unsettled racial conflicts. In the Soviet Union, the more sophisticated students are critical of the older generation for having been involved in, or permitted, the Stalinist excesses. More deeply, the young people are tired of hearing from the older generation about how hard they sacrificed in order to create a new social order.

Manifestations of openly political opposition by students and young intellectuals have occurred at times within communist societies. The first incidents of an overt political nature came in the troublesome years of 1956, when the latent alienation from, or hostility to, the new communist regimes in Eastern Europe first broke out into the open. In the years since 1956 one has seen in Eastern Europe student-led riots, demonstrations, parades, meetings, discussion critical of the regime within the classroom, and, from East Germany at least, flight out of the country.

An increasing number of what remains so far sporadic incidents demonstrates the increasing frustration of many students, and continues to be a source of embarrassment and concern to the communist parties. Students in Czechoslovakia have continued to meet on May Day, despite the banning ever since 1956 of the traditional student's carnival. These meetings have been the occasion for demonstrations against food shortages, the declining standard of living, and, despite a growing liberalization, the restraints placed on intellectual life.

The most recent overt demonstrations of student political views have taken place in Poland. Demonstrations were organized in Warsaw University in the spring of 1964 in support of the thirty-four Polish intellectuals who had written an open letter to the Polish Prime Minister, Josef Cyrankiewicz, demanding a more open cultural policy. In October 1966, fourteenS-