The Deep Pall on Vietnam

But over this progress lies the deep pall created by Vietnam. And this war is the last manifestation of the old stereotypes and the old policy. It is the direct outgrowth of ideas that captured our foreign policy leadership in the time of Stalin. This leadership initiated the present policy in Viet- nam as a reaction to the notion of a unified, all-embracing, world-wide conspiracy of Communism. It probes as the Secretary of State told us for years as did Hitler at Munich, or in a more recent view, as did Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. Its operations were described by Secretary of State Dean Rusk before a Congressional committee not very long ago: he said the "Sino-Soviet bloc is not satisfied with a mere triumph of ideological principles but demands direct subservience to the policies of the block as conceived (sic) in Moscow." In this doctrine Communism has no indigenous roots of any importance. It is not a reaction to local injustice or incompetence. It can never be an expression of national ardor. It is always imposed from without. It demands a military response. Our plunge into Vietnam, let me repeat, as originally conceived was to arrest a probe of this Moscow-directed conspiracy.

Such were the doctrines that launched the original policy. Since then Moscow and Peking have fallen out to the point where there is possible need for concern that their polemics might degenerate into unplanned violence. And China is torn bitterly as between itself. And no one knows whether North Vietnam has its primary association with Moscow or China much less with what factions in China. And there is agreement by all except the custodians of the official truth in Washington that the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam has strong indigenous roots that tap both national ardor and ancient injustice. Never in modern times has history played such a disastrous trick on doctrine.

Two Wars

So the sad truth is that we are now engaged in fighting two wars.

One is against some very determined and very disagreeable people who, we must assume, believe also that they have national identity as well as redress of social grievances on their side. The other struggle is here at home. It is to rescue a policy the foundations of which have visibly and radically eroded before the eyes of the world. It is to prove that those who have staked their reputation on a military solution are right. That was the reason for the unnatural joy in Washington last week--and relayed to the whole world--when Hanoi rejected, or seemed to reject, U Thant's proposals. It was the reason for the Secretary's specially convened press conference to tell delightedly of the intransigance of the enemy. It was a victory in the second conflict.

This is not the way peace is sought and made. Peace requires people that really believe in it--and who have not staked their reputations on conflicting premises. So far as one can tell from the papers if we stop the air attacks we can have negotiations. The air attacks were always the greatest blunder of this war; no one with an understanding of our people would ever have supposed that they would be accepted by thoughtful citizens in the immediate aftermath of an election devoted to proving their recklessness and danger. And the evidence is now in on their lack of military effectiveness. So let us give a bombing suspension a really serious try.

Peacemaking will unquestionably be difficult; it is the nature of our brand of liberalism that it does not invest in illusion. We are adequately aware that it takes two to negotiate. But this door has been opened--let us try it. And let us be glad, not sorry, that the doctrine--the theory of centrally directed and unified conspiracy--that lay behind the misadventure has dissolved. Let us take advantage of this new fact. Above all let us see negotiation and peace not as propaganda ploys but as something we want and must have