THE FOURTH TYPE--Includes many Sinologists who emphasize the the strength of the traditional characteristics of Chinese society in the whole process of the Revolution. They see the idea of the traditional Chinese emperor revived in Maoism and also note a strong trait of Confucianism in the Cultural Revolution. They counsel more cautious judgment on the current turmoils and advocate a greater attempt at understanding Chinese society.
Perhaps the most conspicuous fact about the Japanese reaction to the Revolution is the extent of disillusionment among pro-Chinese intellectuals. They have begun to look at the process of the Revolution with more realistic eyes than before. This profoundly affects the over-all Japanese attitude towards the China problem and towards all Asian problems. Officials of the Japanese government, who once seriously worried of the danger of a Chinese-American war, are now more optimistic because of the Revolution. They now dismiss the possibility of such a war and even dismiss the possibility of Chinese intervention in Vietnam now. Apparently the many elements which had composed the basic picture of China have been changing and with them the picture's color and texture have changed.
China's Future Role
We now believe that Communist China will not be a major force in Southeast Asia in the near future. China will remain an essentially backward country which will be incapable of competing even with the influence of Japan in Asia. On the other hand, we see no sign of a peaceful solution at present. The general impression of the Japanese is that this will be a long drawn-out war.
The Japanese Role in Asia
From these two evaluations emerge two lanes for Japanese diplomacy. One lane is to keep ourselves away from the Vietnam war as much as possible; another is to commit more of our resources to the building up of the economic prosperity of Southeast Asia. We will never take the leadership position on this. The bitter memory of the Japanese occupation is still too vivid in the memories of the Asian nations to permit such a turn of events.
We will take the position of a modest brother who has some previous experience and some resources of modernization. The launching of the economic Ministerial Conference of Southeast Asian countries last year has been a move in this direction and we are not pessimistic about its prospects.
But when speaking in general on American policy in Asia, I sometimes feel it strange that despite these fine scholars and experts in America--such as at Harvard--and a most up-to-date assortment of materials from Asia, Americans suffer from many mis-judgments in their Asian policy. Is the reason a lack of intercourse between scholars and the administration? Or is it a general lack of understanding about Asian problems among the American people? Probably this is a partial explanation. Or is it that America has some sort of limit in the understanding of Asia? I think not, and hope not. Asia is fast changing. I have no doubt that Americans will be able to keep up with the pace of the new changing Asia.