But this same capacity to commit American forces quickly to developing crises made it that much easier for President Johnson to escalate the Vietnam war in 1965 without sustaining immediate political and economic costs at home. The gnawing question remains: was McNamara so effective in making American forces immediately responsive to war that he removed our military operations from popular scrutiny?
After Vietnam, of course, the American public is likely to be far more vigilant when any President begins a piecemeal commitment of American forces to small, strife-torn countries several thousand miles away., It should be recalled, of course, that the post-1965 stage of U.S. involvement in Vietnam saw McNamara make a number of rosy--and utterly specious--predictions about the future of our operations there.
Despite his erratic track record on Vietnam, McNamara probably did more to illuminate publicly the complex strategic problems of the nuclear age than any American official since 1945. He demonstrated with compelling logic and eloquence the need for a strong "second-strike" nuclear capability--and noted, with accuracy, the need for forces to fight non-nuclear wars once it was clear that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could not longer use nuclear weapons against each other without risking mutual destruction.
By Similar logic, according to Adam Yarmolinsky '43, his former top aide, McNamara recently backed the development of a "thin" anti-ballistic missile system to protect the Chinese,--who lacking a "second strike" or "comeback" nuclear capability, are more likely than America or Russia to use nuclear weapons rashly.
It remains McNamara's tragedy, perhaps, despite the power of his arguments that he has frequently failed to appreciate the political consequences of his decisions. For his deployment of a thin ABM system may in time generate pressure to build a far more costly, unnecessary "thick" system to defend against the Russians.
Similarly, McNamara demonstrated political insensitivity in his dealings with Congress and the career military. He apparently felt that intelligence, reason, and eloquence were adequate compensation for skilled bureaucratic diplomacy. In seizing perquisites from Armed Services committees, admirals, and generals, he cultivated so many enemies throughout Washington that his influence in the past year could not do anything but wane.
For all of McNamara's much-ballyhooed computer efficiency and the extraordinary attention he gave to his department, he also influenced the operations of the entire Executive branch more than any of this predecessors. He spearheaded President Kennedy's drive for the 1963 nuclear test-ban treaty, decried the refusal of the rich nations to expedite the development of the poor ones, and was a behind-the-scenes force in federal civil rights and poverty planning. In short, he felt that American defense consisted of more than nuclear hardware, and American prosperity more than a high growth rate and stable price index. For this as much as Vietnam he might be remembered.