Arbitrary Choice

Cohen then stated that the choice between the two theoretical predictions is arbitrary--both were consistent with the facts as each saw them and both predicted a third world war if its course were not followed. The student stated, "all we know for sure is we're killing millions and spending billions under your plan."

Cohen continued that since it is a non-rational choice--balancing an existing war against a predicted War--he said he would choose his side of withdrawal and face Bundy's prediction of a third world war later, if at all.

Almost inaudibly Bundy said to "himself" as one participant remembers, that he still believed what he said was true.

The meeting would continue for several more hours that evening and the next morning, but the climax of the War debate, it was clear to more than one student participant, was over.

Three months went by before the Administration would meet with its student critics again. During those three months the students completed a second letter to President Johnson which stated their opposition to the War more vigorously than in the New Year's letter. Because of the Arab-Israeli War and the resulting Glassboro Summit Conference, the students held off releasing the letter to the press until late June.

The students had indicated that they would release the letter if President Johnson didn't consent to talk to the students. At about the same time--whether by coincidence or because the White House had heard of the student plans and wanted to take the initiative--about eight of the student leaders were invited to meet with Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy on June 28.

The meeting got underway at about 9 a.m. in a second floor conference room in the west wing of the White House. Strobe Talbott from Yale and Steve Cohen, who had just graduated Amherst, would be two of the principle student spokesmen. Douglass Cater, a presidential advisor and one of the Administration's "liberals in residence"; Daniel Davidson, a Bundy aide; and William Bundy were among the Administration representatives.

Frightening Stands

The most important result of this meeting, from the students' point of view, was the "frightening" nature of William Bundy's view of Southeast Asia. Their fright stemmed from two of his stands: his view that a military solution will be achieved within three years and his emphasis on the importance of the war in the future of Southeast Asia.

The students were amazed by Bundy's optimism about the war, after they had spoken to his brother and other military sources who had said that it was impossible to predict when the military phase would end.

Bundy seemed to think, from what one participant said later, that the Viet Cong would become discouraged on one particular day in the future and give up fighting. The students, though not privy to any of the inside military information which Bundy had, considered the Assistant Secretary of State "way off base."

Bundy also stated, according to student participants, that the United States is not only fighting in Vietnam to prevent a third world war as his brother had stated three months earlier, but that the future welfare of 250 million people on the rim of Southeast Asia was also at stake.

One student commended after hearing Bundy: "If I could ever believe that even half of what Bundy believes is at stake in the war, I would fervently support the Administration's policies. However, after seeing what has happened with the supposedly enslaved peoples of Eastern Europe in the last few years, I can hardly agree with Bundy's simplistic predictions for the future of Southeast Asia."

Cohen and Bundy discussed negotiations. To the amazement of the students, the Secretary admitted that the North Vietnamese were willing to negotiate, but the State Department, after capturing several secret Communist documents, had reached the conclusion that the negotiations would only be a ploy to gain more time for the Viet Cong. Hanoi was not willing to negotiate on any sort of "reasonable terms." Bundy told the student leaders.

Peace Feelers

At noon, the meeting moved to the dining room of a hotel across the street from the White House, where an informal discussion continued over lunch. Cohen talked with Bundy's aide in charge of following up peace feelers, Dan Davidson. The Amherst student leader commented later about Davidson, "it becomes crystal clear to me why there are no negotiations from peace feelers with a man of his views in charge of following up peace feelers. Davidson seemed to view any offer from the Communists prima facie as duplicitous simply because they are Communists. Close minded is perhaps the best word to describe his attitude."

The meeting continued into the afternoon on a reduced basis after Cohen, Talbott, and Bundy left. No new ground was covered, however, according to one of the student leaders.

A few days later the student released their second and last letter to President Johnson. The group of 200 student body presidents and campus editors which had brought about a real, though secret, dialogue between the Administration and its critics during the group's ten-month existence broke up.

They had accomplished their original purpose of telling the Johnson Administration how many non-radical students felt about the War. In the context of their original goals; few groups have accomplished as much.