Look back and imagine the kind of world we now would have if we had adopted a different course. What kind of Europe would now exist if there had been no commitment to Greece and Turkey? No Marshall Plan? No NATO? No defense of Berlin? Would Europe and the world be better off or worse? Would the possibilities of detente be on the present horizon?

Then turn the globe and look at Asia. If we had made no commitments and offered no assistance, what kind of Asia would there now be? Would there be a confident and vital South Korea? A prosperous and peaceful Japan? Would there be the new spirit of regional cooperation and forward movement now developing throughout Asia?

If you were to talk to the leaders of Asia as I have, you would know that the new vigor in Asia, the new hope and determination, are based in part on the conviction that the United States will continue to support the South Vietnamese in their struggle to build a life of their own within the framework of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 -- that we shall see it through to an honorable peace.

Second, you wonder whether our vital interests are best protected by our growing commitment.

We must always weigh what we are doing against the requirements of the situation and what the other side is doing. You are aware, I am sure, that the flow of men and material from North Vietnam into the South radically increased towards the end of 1964 and continued at a high level in the next two years. It was to meet that escalation, designed to achieve military victory by the North against the South, that we sent our men in large numbers and began an air campaign against military targets in North Vietnam.

At the other end of the scale, one must contrast what we are doing with what we could be doing. You know the power that is available to us--in men, resources and weaponry.

We have done both more than some people would wish, and less than other advocate. We have been guided both by the demands imposed upon us by increased aggression and by the need for restrtaint in the application of force. We have been doing what the President judges to be necessary to protect the nation's vital interests, after hearing the views of the government's military and civilian experts. We shall continue to do what is necessary to meet the threat the Vietnamese and their allies face.

Third, you raise the question whether a war that may devastate much of the countryside can lead to the stable and prosperous Vietnam we hope for.

First, it is an error to suggest that the fighting in Vietnam has devastated "much of the countryside." There has been too much destruction and disruption -- as there is any war. And we deeply regret the loss of life that is involved -- the South and in the North among both soldiers and civilians.

But devastation has been far less than on the conventional battlefields of World War II and Korea. If peace could come to South Vietnam today, I think most people would be amazed at its rapid recovery. For the Vietnamese are intelligent, energetic, and ambitious people. And they are determined to see their country prosper. I am confident that they can achieve that end -- if they but have the chance to do so, in peace and in their own way.

That day cannot come too soon.

You also suggest that there are "apparent contradictions" in the American position on efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement.

We have said that there will be no difficulty in having the views of the Viet Cong presented at any serious negotiation. The details of how this might be done can be discussed with the other side; there is little point in negotiating such details with those who cannot stop the fighting.

We have made it clear that we cannot accept the Liberation Front as the "sole" or "only legitimate voice" of