Against this indictment, the proponents of CB warfare offer basically one argument: that this new weaponry would create a more humane way of making war. Although CB weapons can be lethal, the emphasis is certainly on the non-lethal versions, because it is their ability to incapacitate without killing that makes them unique. If it is noble to kill only soldiers in war while sparing civilians, how much more noble it is to render the soldiers unable to conduct war, without killing anyone.

Meselson believes that this argument breaks down when carefully examined. First, he says, one must realize that lethal and non-lethal are poles on a continuous spectrum of the effects of weapons. A weapon which is non-lethal can either temporarily incapacitate (like tear gas) or permanently maim. As long as it does not kill, it is non-lethal.

The use of non-lethal CB weapons would serve as an "opening wedge," Meselson fears, to a gradual movement along the spectrum in the direction of kill. This is not just a legal point -- although there are problems of which types of weapons are outlawed by which treaties -- but a practical one as well. The techniques of manufacture, the methods of distribution, and the logistics of employing the devices would be about the same for lethal and non-lethal CB weapons. Meselson says.

It is like teaching a boy all there is to know about shooting rubber-tipped arrows from his bow, and expecting him never to try a steel-tipped shaft. Meselson would say that the rubber-tipped arrows are nice, but the steel-tipped ones are more horrible than anything now known. Can you expect a boy to refrain from experimenting, just once?

"There are individuals in every military," Meselson says, "who want to run the whole gamut of weapons." Having non-lethal weapons would not make war less lethal, he asserts. "It is a ridiculous assumption that giving field commanders weapons that don't need to kill means the commanders will not kill. What will happen is that non-lethal weapons will be used in conjunction with killers."

This distinction between the lethal and the non-lethal also leads to some touchy problems in international relations. If a country has a policy of using only non-lethal CB arms, Meselson says, only that country knows for sure it is a non-lethal policy. And there is, at this time, no biological equivalent for seismographic detection of nuclear testing, so suspicious nations could not find out what is actually being done in the enemy camp.

U.S. Responsibility

If CB warfare becomes conventional, Meselson believes it will be due primarily to the United States. Conversely, control of this style of war must also be America's responsibility. It is the U.S. which is now using chemical weapons in Vietnam, and it is the U.S. which refused to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol which deplores the use or even development of such weapons. The Protocol was written by the U.S., signed by the U.S., but not ratified by the Senate. America has nonetheless always had a "cautious respect" for the treaty, according to Meselson.

If it is America's responsibility to show the world the way to abolish CB warfare, Meselson's activity reflects the idea that it is the scientists' responsibility to convince America to do it. Scientists do not usually lead political movements for a variety of reasons, including the fact they do not want government to restrict their freedom in science, so they reciprocate in advance. But on certain issues, these men who create in laboratories feel that they understand their offspring better than the government which charges itself with the responsibility of bringing up the child. It happened to physicists after World War II with atomic energy. And it is happening now to biologists.

There is one fundamental difference between the two campaigns. The development of atomic energy was a well-kept secret during the war -- Harry Truman had never heard of the Manhattan Project until he assumed the presidency, which was but a few months before the U.S. struck against Japan. Scientists who were used to the free channels of communication which have characterized the profession for centuries forced themselves to develop the weapon for their country in an emergency, with little discussion of the virtues of the plan. CB warfare, on the other hand, is being developed largely in the open.

Scientists' Fears

Only after the war could physicists express their fear of what they had created. But in journals of recent years, much has been written about CB weapons. The U.S. is not making any attempt to hide the fact that it is doing research.

So Meselson and Edsall are not leading a protest of scientists who worked on the weapon and now want it responsibly suppressed. They are men who feel they understand what the weapon would be like, and they want to stop this Manhattan Project before it progresses too far.

It is not easy to marshal scientific opinion in this country. "I do not think," Meselson admits, "that the majority of scientists wish to take political action on this or any other issue. A substantial minority does."

"I am amazed," he continues, "with the response to our letter to President Johnson." Only about 3000 copies were mailed out, primarily to members of the Federation of American Scientists (which, incidentally, was organized after World War II to fight military control of atomic energy) and yet over 5000 have signed.

Presdent Johnson has already received a copy of the letter with 22 signatures affixed. It was sent to the White House in late August, "as a courtesy measure." No one knows how he will react to a message with 5000 learned signatures.

For Meselson, of course, the prime issue is to keep closed "this Pandora's box." But his efforts will also be a significant test of whether a large number of scientists can, in their own sphere, influence the Chief Executive, in much the same way they influenced Congress two decades ago