I certainly would, and I don't my self believe that there is any plan or any desire or any good sense really in supposing that this thing can be handled if it comes to depend entirely on American arms...

QUESTION:

You said that neither President Kennedy nor President Johnson had foreseen a rapid solution to the War. I think one of the problems here is that many students at Harvard tend to make a distinction between the policies of the two administrations. When President Kennedy began the effort, we understood that the men the United States was sending over were advisors. The implication at that time was that this was a Vietnamese was and that we couldn't win it for them. It seems that the emphasis has quite definitely changed, so that the situation is now discussed in terms of how much help Vietnam should give to the United States... Are we prepared to make this essentially an, American war? Is there any limit to the size of our commitment in Vietnam, and if this limit is high, what exactly is the rationale of American presence in Vietnam?

BUNDY:

I myself believe that the fundamental policy of the United States toward Vietnam is now as it was in President Kennedy's administration...He regarded it as important, difficult, demanding, dangerous, and requiring a very substantial American investment and effort in the situation as it was at that time. Our investment has increased. We are accountable for our decisions now and we are facing the possibility that American troops may play a quite different role. Indeed, the engagement of American forces has changed tactically a number of times over recent years. So the question comes-"Are we making it an American war?". I said before that I don't think it makes sense to try to make it an all-American war. I believe that it does have to be construed fundamentally as an effort in support of a society... to which we are deeply committed.

As to the question of "to what end" the contest is directed, I believe that there is a double purpose here. I do not think it can be defined in terms of a blanket "end Communism." There are situations in which it is not possible for the influence of the United States to be such... In Vietnam we have resources and we have made commitments. We are engaged there in a situation in which both the interests of the society to which we are committed and wider interests-both of the people of Southeast Asia and of the people of the United States-are at stake. If a position is held in Vietnam [such that] there is growing freedom of choice for that society in determining its own future, then the hope that this kind of openness of choice may be extended to other areas is increased. If the effort in Vietnam falls, that hope is decreased. I believe that the neighboring peoples in Southeast Asia realize that this is the kind of stake involved...

QUESTION

How many Americans is the Administration prepared to send to Vietnam?

BUNDY

I cannot tell you the exact decisions which the Administration is going to make. It makes its decisions by a process of discussion and analysis... The President did not give me a day off for the purpose of my announcing decisions he hasn't made.

I think it is possible that there will be more Americans in South Vietnam...

QUESTION

Wouldn't some sort of international negotiations be preferable to the tactics of terror and killing now going on in Vietnam?

BUNDY

... The government is trying to get a serious international discussion going... It is ready to discuss this matter and work toward a peaceful settlement. It has tried a number of forums to see whether there is readiness for this kind of effort. The record is clear that the unreadiness for negotiation is not now in the United States... Whatever happens in Vietnam, there is every reason for the United States to persevere in the effort to give appropriate support and encouragement to governments which are trying to work their way toward the establishment of viable political societies outside of the kind of costs which Communist imposes...