So Joseph Rauh quietly took over. Vice-Chairman of ADA and leader of the Democratic Party in Washington, Rauh spent most of July preparing the FDP's legal case for the Credentials Committee. With the approach of August, he also assumed responsibility for gathering Northern delegate strength. It was a difficult task, since the President was actively working for the "traditional" delegation.

Rauh began his campaign for support by sprucing up the FDP's image. Seeking to eradicate the popular conception of the Party as a SNCC-CORE enterprise, he requested active support from the NAACP and the National Council of Churches. Clarence Mitchell, NAACP Washington representative, is a close friend of Rauh, and by early August Mitchell had pressed the Association into action: Roy Wilkins pledged to endorse the Freedom delegation before the Platform and Credentials Committees. Bishop Spike, of the National Council of Churches Commission on Race and Religion, also agreed to lend a hand behind the scenes.

On 14 August, top religious and civil rights officials pleaded the Party's case at the White House. They secured from the four LBJ aides assigned to the "Mississippi question" a shaky promise of Administration neutrality. Johnson now realized that the FDP enjoyed fairly broad and prestigious support, that it could not be neatly swept under the rug.

Johnson Sobered

The events of 16 August further sobered the President, for that evening the California Democratic Executive Committee overwhelmingly accepted a pro-FDP resolution that was openly opposed by Governor Brown and the White House. Thus, on the eve of the convention's first week, the Party's fortunes looked far brighter than anyone would have dared predict in June.

Rauh was now on the phone 12 to 14 hours a day, cashing in on a life-time of political favors owed him in liberal circles. As a UAW legal counsel, he enjoyed excellent relations with labor and soon secured formal endorsement from all UAW and IUE members who were Democratic delegates. Even the officially non-partisan AFL-CIO lent moral support in the back room.

Sensitive to party-wide anxiety over "backlash," Rauh peddled the FDP as a liberal, not solely a civil rights, movement and dwelled on the corruption, disloyalty, and conservatism of the "traditional" delegation, playing only lightly on the discrimination issue. The FDP, argued Rauh was a viable political alternative to the "traditional" party, not just an organized protest against the bigotry of the "traditional."

While Rauh horsetraded deftly behind closed doors, the Party's Washington office stumbled through a convention-eve public relations campaign. Foreseeing a listless convention, Party leaders had long realized that the "Mississippi question" would receive inordinate press coverage in late August. Yet, inexplicably, the Party never developed an orderly publicity drive.

By the beginning of platform hearings on August 17, news-starved reporters were bombarding the Washington FDP office for information. Each met with a reception one reporter termed "curt, cold, and nasty:" "The delegates will be here next weekend. If you want more, call Jackson."

Instead of calling Jackson, most newsmen understandably shrugged, swilled another scotch on the Democratic Party, and wandered off to interview the two "traditional" Mississippi delegates who wisely attended the platform hearings in order to snare important television time and newspaper space.

On Tuesday, because of inadequate advance notice, the Washington FDP office released Rauh's legal brief to a half-attended conference. When notified that some reporters hadn't seen the brief, the office manager snapped: "Well then let them come over and pick one up." Harried newsmen, quartered in the Sheraton Park Hotel, found it difficult to travel cross town to the office, and as a result many never read the FDP's case.

The Party's challenge strategy often appeared as confused as its public relations effort. From the beginning of the summer, the FDP had refused to discuss compromise, at one time publicly castigating Senator Paul Douglas for proposing a 50-50 seating solution. Before the convention such intransigence was essential to maintain a decent bargaining posture. However, as the Credentials Committee continued negotiating and the FDP refused to yield, many of the Party's allies became uneasy.

On Monday morning, August 24, Administration mediators offered the Party a "fraternal delegation" compromise, whereby "traditionals" who signed a loyalty oath would be seated in the Mississippi section, and the FDP would receive floor space with no voting rights. Rauh turned the offer down and began gathering votes, for a minority report and a floor fight. His action alienated many wavering delegations.

After hearing of the stalemate Monday afternoon, Vermont's Governor Hoff expressed to a group of FDP lobbyists the consensus of many Northern moderates: "Don't you recognize your responsibility to the Party and the country? When you're up against a Goldwater, you sacrifice for party harmony or lose not only Mississippi but the nation, maybe the world. I'm for you morally, but if you push this to the floor I'll vote against you."

Late Monday night Roy Wilkins visited FDP spokesman Aaron Henry and urged him to back down. Henry refused and the Party lost NAACP support. Rauh and King continued to counsel firmness. The wisdom of their resolve was proven Tuesday when the Administration offered a fresh compromise, giving the Freedom Party two at-large seats on the floor. Under intense Presidential pressure, New York and California, the core of the FDP's support, agreed to the proposal. In a hurried caucus of the Freedom delegation, Rauh and King urged the Party to accept the compromise and hail it as a great victory.