Tshombe's fondness for the Belgians seemed stronger than ever when, during Katanga's secession, he insisted that Belgian troops remain in Katanga in preference to the central government's troops and to the United Nations soldiers sent to maintain order in the Congo. Dag Hammarskjold assured him that UN forces wouldn't interfere in his affairs, but Tshombe still refused to let them in. UN forces began to replace the Belgians in September. But Tshombe still had his own mercenaries. He neither cooperated with the UN nor dismissed the mercenaries. Through the end of 1962, Tshombe agreed repeatedly to cease-fires, and even to the reintegration of Katanga into the Congo. But Tshombe made such agreements only when he himself was arrested or when the UN threatened to use force. In December, 1962, Katanga was still independent and Tshombe's mercenaries were still there. But late that month, UN troops retaliated against Katangese military attacks by capturing Elisabethville. The UN made it clear that it would tolerate no more nonsense. Less than a month later, Tshombe gave the UN soldiers complete freedom of movement and agreed definitely to end Katanga's secession.

Europeau Exile

Tshombe went to Europe for medical care in February and March, returned to the Congo, and then went into exile in Spain. By July he was writing letters from Barcelona to Congolese politicians: he developed ties with the three most powerful men behind the Adoula government: General Mobutu, Minister of Justice Bomboko and chief of the national security police, Nendaka. In February, 1964, a Tshombe propoganda newsletter began appearing in Leopoldville.

There was at least one attempt, late in 1963, to bring Tshombe back, and when the revolutionary activity in northern and northeastern Congo became serious, negotiations between Tshombe and the government began in earnest. The feeling grew that only a "government of reconciliation" could hold the country together. Adoula's government certainly was not doing it. Tshombe was the only man who had any effective control of Katanga. He had won only 25 of 60 legislative seats in Katanga's only election, and without ever controlling the province military, had power and connections in Katanga far greater than any one else's. He had the support of Mobutu, Bomboko and Nendaka, the powers behind the throne.

Hero's Return

Tshombe returned to the Congo in late June. Almost immediately, he became Prime Minister of the country under a new constitution. Kasavubu remained as president. Even before Tshombe took office, he began trying to consolidate support. He won a promise of unconditional support from Andre Lubaya ,an important member of the National Liberation Committee, a group of leftist exiles which has partially guided and supported the revolutionary forces. Tshombe got Adoula to promise the prompt release of Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's former lieutenant.

Tshombe didn't have to worry about winning over most of Leopold-ville's politicians. He may have left as a long-standing enemy of the country, but he came back as the most sought-after man in Congolese politics. His main political difficulty has been dealing with the National Liberation Committee. The Committee has not come to terms with him, and Committee members have denounced Lubaya widely as a traitor.

The Committee may become more receptive if Tshombe's apparent military success of the past few days continues. Tshombe's victories have, however, been won with the help of white mercenary officers and of planes supplied by the United States and flown by Cuban exile pilots recruited in Miami. The Congolese Prime Minister has opened himself once again to charges of being an agent of outside influences.

U.S. Attitude

What are Tshombe's relations with the Western nations? The Belgians were glad to see him back. The United States, which has given him substantial aid, was not. The United States wants the revolts in the Congo suppressed and the government stabilized. It would much rather have gained these obectives with Adoula as Prime Minister. It will support Tshombe only because he seems the one Congolese politician with any chance of success.

But the United States doesn't particularly like Tshombe. It never has. When Tshombe took Katanga out of the Congo, the only two Western nations favorable to him were Belgium and France. Those two countries met with such strong opposition from the rest of the world, including the United States, that not even Belgium ever recognized his government.

Tshombe's main value to the United States and its allies, and his greatest personal asset, is his remarkable political resiliency. Less than two years ago, when he left the Congo after failing in his attempt to tear the country apart, he was the central government's greatest foe, opposed by the United States and most of the world. Today he is leading the central government in an attempt to hold the Congo together, and the United States is helping greatly with his military operations.

This is Tshombe's salient characteristic: his ability to bounce from ally to ally, from attitude to attitude, from obective to objective. He is not a colonialist tool; He is just an opportunist who once thought the grass would be greener on the colonialist side of the fence. His lack of devotion to principle is not unique in Congo politics; nor is his lack of morality. But in a country of dubious political figures, he has been the slimiest and the most amphibious of all