Only an independent Europe can be expected to defend itself, because only it would have something to defend. A Frenchman will not fight for the American way of life.
Deference and Defiance
Why did France blackball British entry into the Common Market?
During the Second World War, it was clear to both Churchill and de Gaulle that America would henceforth hold a mortgage on the fate of Europe. But the two men responded to this fact in different ways. As Churchill told de Gaulle: "It is better to persuade the stronger than to pit yourself against him. . . . The Americans have immense resources. . . . I am trying to enlighten them, without forgetting, of course, to benefit my country." This is the definition of the "special relationship," which Britain has pursued for twenty years. British policy assumes that by deferring where necessary to the United States (as at Nassau), Britain can obtain better treatment from her master. De Gaulle believes the opposite.
When the Common Market was formed, Britain refused a charter membership, because she preferred to base her policies on the "special relationship" with the United States. But the "special relationship" is the antithesis of Gaullist Europe. "What concerns us," said the French Foreign Minister at Brussels, "is not whether the Europe we are trying to create is big or small, but whether it is European." "European," in this sense, means "Gaullist," which means independent of the United States.
At Nassau, however, Britian showed that she was not European in this sense at all. Despite the abrupt abandonment of the Skybolt Program, which meant the end of at least semi-independence for the British, Macmillan once again leased the destiny of his country to the United States.
The "multinational" Polaris force promised by 1968 in place of the Skybolt does not fool many people. Like all other "multinational" NATO programs, it will be under the effective control of the United States.
De Gaulle gave his reason for blackballing the British when he said on January 24:
At the Bahamas, Britain turned over to America such poor atomic forces as it possessed. Britain could have handed them to Europe. Britain has made its choice. I am distressed to see England align herself with the U.S., for she risks acting like their traveling salesman.
A deferent Britain has no place in a defiant Europe.
Divorce-Kennedy Style
There are two diametrically opposite forces at work in the Atlantic Alliance. One is national interest, the other collective security. It may seem an obvious thing to say, but Washington has apparently forgotten it: the national interests of two states can never exactly coincide.
Cuba meant life or death to the United States, and less to any of the Europeans. Berlin means more to them than it does to us. Our interests are increasingly global, and a concession in one area may balance an equal or greater gain in another. Europe's interests are increasingly parochial, and they can make no sacrifices at all on their own continent. A tactician as skilled as Khrushchev can always present a limited threat, or the offer of a compromise bargain, which is in our interest but not in Europe's. And vice versa, of course.
Under such circumstances, is it surprising that France is restive when she has no control over her own destiny?
Collective security is a very real concept, and it gives the Alliance a wide common interest. But Kennedy cannot pretend that America's interests are identical with those of Europe. He would do well, therefore, to permit the existence of a loyal opposition within the NATO group.
Yet he seems determined to have it his own way, less because he wants to crush the miraculously revived Europe than because he does not understand it. He is personally affronted and he will have his reprisals against de Gaulle. Like the mythical Italian who must murder his wife to obtain a divorce, the President of the United States would rather try to ostracize France than live in a divided house.
It would be better if he knew what he was doing before he did it.