He quite rightly emphasizes the close interrelation between strategy and arms control, and the need to stabilize the deterrent equation before attempting any meaningful arms reduction. But he hinges his arguments for stabilization--then-control (or reduction, if attainable) on two temporary weaknesses in the U.S. posture--the vulnerability of our strategic retaliatory forces and the emptiness of massive retaliation.

The effect is distracting. Hadley discusses these strategic weaknesses to briefly that he emerges a poor man's Herman Kahn. He proceeds to arms control after showing the need for stabilizing, i.e., boosting deterrence. But he has proven his case only to his own satisfaction.

Not only does Hadley deal inadequately with strategy, but he also presents arms control in a shallow manner. Although he says several times that arms control is no panacea, his failure to explore the actual essence of arms control yields that impression. In other words, the reader puts down his book thinking that if only the nation were as bright as Hadley and consequently understood the need for arms control, it could then buy "it" downtown somewhere.

In short, Hadley is so concerned with showing how important arms control is that he neglects the equally critical problems of implementing it. He neglects the bulk of what Schelling and Halperin discuss--arms control itself.

But while Schelling and Halperin are excellent in discussions of certain areas where each has done special research (surveillance forces, limited wars), their treatment of some topics is entirely too sketchy. Sometimes, as with politico-military points, the authors simply admit this and dismiss it, saying it is beyond the scope of their book which aims at the military consequences of arms control. Even admitting this defense, at other times one finds the presentation altogether lacking in detail; for instance, the sub-chapter on the Nth country problem, is only four paragraphs long. The ultimate effect is a solid treatment of some topics and a sketchy one of others leaving the book in a certain sense unbalanced.

Schelling and Halperin make the novel point that inspection has been vastly overemphasized. They argue that arms control agreements should be based on mutual interest, and an interest strong enough that both sides should want to convince the opponent it is in fact complying with the agreement. Each side should have a fundamental interest in "persuasively demonstrating its own compliance."

Hadley's book, by injecting concreteness through its constant mention of Minutemen and Polarises, may be fine for persons completely uninformed about strategy. But this very timeliness now will create an early obsolescence, while Schelling and Halperin manage to treat arms control as a more theoretical notion.

If the Twentieth Century Fund believed in advertising the books it publishes, we might seo this ad: "To be fully informed, read Schelling and Halperin." However true this statement is, the book has received no publicity to speak of. Thus the public will read Hadley; Harvard types should follow the advertising council's advice and discriminate.