Lincoln Steffens, disillusioned after years of muckraking, once remarked that "misgovernment of the American people is misgovernment by the American people. The typical citizen is too busy to take a serious interest in politics, and when his neglect has permitted bad government to go so far that he can be stirred to action, he is unhappy, and he looks around for a cure that will be quick. The patent remedy is quack."

Massachusetts tried a remedy in 1940. It was branded "quack," labeled "communistic," and praised as the "biggest step forward in Massachusetts' political history." This was Plan E, which provides for a city manager to run a city's affairs and a nine man council, including a mayor, who legislate.

Plan E. failed in many cities, just like Stiffens said quick remedies would, but he turned out to be wrong in one city--Cambridge.

Cambridge's League of Women Voters started thumping for adoption of Plan E in 1935 with a campaign for proportional representation. After a five year battle the State Legislature passed Plan E and other cities besides Cambridge voted to use it. They thought it would be a political panacea, but it wasn't. Lowell tried it, but Lowell did not improve. Waltham got a Plan E city manager, but the boodle boys and professional politicians who controlled the city council then voted the manager out of office, and put one of their men in his place.

But Plan E in Cambridge proved a startling success. Cambridge government was no different from Lowell's or Waltham's. It was contented and corrupt when Plan E was adopted; its major had just gone to jail for accepting a 30 percent kickback from an architect who did city work.

Plan E was a success in Cambridge because of a powerful civic group--something other cities that adopted the Plan E charter did not have. The original reformers, members of the League of Women Voters, formed the Cambridge Committee for Plan E the predecessor of the present Cambridge Civic Association. In 1945 reform government in Cambridge nearly failed because the Cambridge Committee for Plan E had begun to lose its prestige and power by taking a virtual "holier-than thou" attitude. The Cambridge Civic Association was founded then, and from that time on, the City Council has been CCA dominated.

University Relations Improve

Almost everyone in City Hall concedes that conditions have improved considerably under Plan E and the rule of the Cambridge Civic Association. Relations with the University have taken a turn under CCA too. No longer does the City Council threaten to declare Harvard a separate city as it did in 1938. Nor do Cambridge police lay heavy clubs on heads of over exuberant students quite so often. The first Plan E mayor, John Corcoran, went so far as to establish an annual dinner between the City Council and top University officials.

There are those who say that the CCA has had nothing to do with the improvement in Cambridge government. The most vociferous opponents are City Council members not endorsed by the CCA. Councillor John D. Lynch, once CCA-endorsed, contends: "To a certain extent, the CCA is machine politics." Even more critical is Edward J. Sullivan, son of "Mickey the Dood" Sullivan, one of Cambridge's most colorful politicians. Councillor Sullivan maintains that the CCA has never done, and will never do, anything for Cambridge. "The CCA is definitely machine politics," he claims, "and the city manager is drunk with power."

Trucking Racket

But most city officials agree that Cambridge today is much better off than it was in the days of the trucking and snowplow rackets and the part-time labor fraud. Before reform, some Cambridge mayors controlled the city's trucks and could assure themselves reelection by hiring extra part-time labor. For instance, one mayor was known to call up a majority of the fifteen City Councilors the night before a Council meeting almost all of whom had an interest in a trucking contract with the city for snow removal or refuse collection. Then he would warn them that unless they voted for a specific measure at the Council meeting, they would lose their city contracts. And a city trucking contract is much too lucrative to throw away over a single vote.

A month before election, a mayor in the old days would put on as much part-time labor as possible. But he would do so only on the condition that the workers he hired would vote for him in the coming election. By election day, citizens would see ten or fifteen men digging graves (a job ordinarily requiring only two), refuse trucks with twelve man crews, and innumerable street sweepers, who handed out campaign literature at strategic street corners. The mayor or the crony he was supporting would surely be reelected. However, the city's payroll would be exhausted, causing wholesale dismissals of both regular and part-time laborers after Election Day.

The corruption finally became too obvious. The Boston Transcript commented: "Payrolls in Cambridge show a curious increase at election time, particularly in the street department. During the week of August 5, the street department payroll was $16,100. It was gradually built up until during the week of November 11, it had jumped to $41,500. A week later, indicating the extent to which the taxpayers' money had been used for political purposes, the payrolls in the department dropped to $21,500--half that of the preceding week."

Cheap Politicians

In May, 1941, the Police Chief told the City Council: "I've been harassed by cheap politicians every day in the week and I've had political interference in my department for years. I don't mind doing favors for people, but I do mind being asked to obstruct justice." Editorially, the Boston Herald cried out: "Never in the history of Cambridge has been increasing its total to nearly other cities have been reducing their debt, Cambridge has been increasing its total to nearly $9,000,000."