All agreed that an overt act in Formosa would be unwise because it could lead to a war with China.
Beyond the 38th
The University's Far Eastern scholars unanimously favored extension of the U.N. military campaign beyond the 38th parallel. Reischauer put the issue plainly. "The only conceivable military tactic," he said, "is to push on... in fact, if we stopped, few Asiatics would understand why."
Fairbank and Schwartz, while while they were in fundamental agreement, emphasized the need for caution in crossing the 38th parallel. A blunt march over the line could fire Russian feeling beyond the kindling point, they suggested. Hence the campaign in what is now Northern Korea should be waged only after such a project has received the blessing of the U.N.
Once peace is restored in the northern sector, Korea must be unified and provided with a U.N. sponsored provisional government to rule during a free campaign and election, Fairbank prescribed. The results of the election should be accepted, he added, even if they result in a part Communist government.
Schwartz warned that we should go "very slowly" about launching a military occupation of North Korea because such an act might alienate Asian sympathy toward this country. "Instead we should promise ultimate unity and inde- pendence," he said, "because that is one thing we can get all Koreans to agree on."
When a government is established, Fairbank and Reischauer stated, the Koreans will need much economic help. With the U.N.'s resources in back of them, however, the Koreans should be able to rebuild their communications and some basic industry pretty quickly, Fairbank feels.
The appointment of George C. Marshall, who headed a special mission to China in 1946, as Secretary of Defense, was applauded by those questioned. Schwartz maintained that although the official Communist line was anti-Marshall the Truman appointment "would probably be received favorably in the Far East."
Reischauer agreed that Marshall Commanded world-wide respect, but tended to minimize the importance in Asia of Marshall's personal contacts with the Chinese Communists. He said that "the Communist bible of beliefs is not affected by personalities.
Discussing the nation's over-all foreign policy in Asia, Reischauer declared, "Our biggest mistake in Asia is our failure to spread out ideology." He deplored the policy of a Congress which now is spending billions of dollars on arms in Korea but which "refused to spend even a million to train the South Koreans in the art of democratic government."
Reischauer stressed that Russia had won "cheap success" in Asia by the primary use of propaganda and that the United States might profit by this lesson. Economic and military aid should be employed in that order after ideological training, said 'Reischauer.
Hopper noted, however, that the Communist propaganda machine which promises immediate economic reforms runs at a tremendous advantage because it has "the ally, poverty." Meanwhile, the Western propaganda machine can spout only abstract concepts such as democracy, freedom, and the hope of material improvement.
The "Nehru Program" of removing the economic conditions on which Communism thrives would take 100 years to fulfill, Hopper feels.
Asked where the next Communist outbreak might be expected, Hopper replied that it would "probably come where it is least expected by the West." He said the Korean show was a complete surprise at the time, though is retrospect it should have been obvious. The next move might be similar.