By baring his economic fangs to the extent of a four month quasi-embargo on the expert of vital foodstuffs to Bolivia, Argentina's dictator, Juan D. Peron, has succeeded in sweating an important trade contract out of mineral-rich Bolivia and has added another balky satellite to his growing sphere of influence. The pact was ostensibly signed in an aura of good will and mutual agreement, but actually was achieved through a complete strangulation of Bolivian economy. Dependent on Argentina for ninety percent of its wheat and sixty percent of its meat quota, the newly democratic government unwisely flaunted its independence in Peron's whiskers and speedily found that all rail lines leading to the frontier-had developed a sudden shortage of rolling stock. The Bolivian government held off to the point of bankruptey and then quietly succumbed to Peron's demand for minerals and collaboration. A simple and vicious application of an agricultural tourniquet to a democratic government for political reasons vividly defines Argentina's ambitions for South American hegemony and points up her real menace to hemispheric solidarity.

Generally regarded as a miniature Frankenstein run amok, Argentine policy quickly assumes life-size proportions when it is seen that similar pacts, always manufactured under the pressure of agricultural wealth, are being negotiated with Uruguay, Paraguay, and Chile. These accords will build Argentina into a totalitarian colossus of the south and cannot help but destroy any South American attempt at a healthy state system, Definitely uneasy, but completely befuddled, the United States has alternately adopted a hot and cold policy towards Argentina that has strengthened Peron and bewildered what Latin-American supporters the State Department has left. When Ambassador Braden interfered with internal Argentine politics in a get tough policy, Peron was swept into office among cries of "Yankee Imperialism" and the current attitude of appeasement allowed Argentina to suck Bolivia into its fold.

Political intervention cannot stop Peron, especially within the rigidly policed confines of his own state, and economic sanctions are useless on a country as wealthy as Argentina. There remains only the necessity for halting Argentine encroachment by aiding the unproductive states that come under Peron's thumb through their economic dependence. If American farmers can afford to dump leads of potatoes on the ground to protect the market, then they can also supply badly needed foodstuffs for Bolivian miners. A program of adding the economically weak countries of South America to the list of nations benefitting by American food would supply the incentive for vigorous opposition to the evils of Argentine expansion. By capitalizing on the current hatred of Peron, the United States would throttle the latent belief that American interest in South America is built around nothing but the dollar sign and put a few needed teeth into its plan for hermispheric solidarity. If Argentina is allowed to swing its economic axe, unfettered Latin-Americans can hope for nothing better than the crumbs from Peron's vest.