Deductions from the above:-
None.
Reasons, a priori; or proof, a posteriori:-
None.
It will be seen that the writer goes a step farther than the celebrated Spinoza; for, instead of assuming a proposition which involves the desired conclusion, he has hit upon the equally beautiful and simple method of stating at once, in ipsis verbis, the things to be proved. If this is the development of reason fished from the ultramarine depths of modern thought, we may save ourselves the trouble of classifying it; for it is an exceedingly nasty creature, and was known to our old-fogy ancestors under the name of gratuitous invective. However, such argument has the merit of being easily confuted. As the premises and the conclusions are identical, we suppress both by denying, with varying degrees of earnestness, all the former, - speaking comparatively, of course, with reference to any other secular college; for we should hesitate to predicate anything concerning the relation of our general morality with the high ideal standard of the writer.
It is then asserted that culture results from morality; the absurdity of which statement becomes evident in the necessary deduction that George III. and a Chinese bonze would both be men of high culture. If the writer will but allow me to invert his proposition, I can cordially agree; for it will ever be true that high moral character is the most perfect blossom of true culture. It is worthy of notice that the writer, after a peculiarly spiteful attack on Harvard men, defines culture as perfect sympathy "with every mood, passion, and failing in all ages and climes."
The remaining part of the article, which takes up the question of the evil influence of the Nation on the student mind, has so many of the peculiar faults of that journal, that it must necessarily have some of its excellences; but the argument is most curiously inconsistent. After condemning several student characteristics in a manner truly searching and Nationesque, the writer suddenly turns around and condemns that journal for the very faults which are most conspicious in his own article. He actually out Nations the Nation in pessimism, and then, probably remembering the Golden Rule, quotes the Nation's words, which deny any influence to scholars, but thank them for the inestimable service of keeping alive the conception of a better state of things. We can but take the hint, and while fearing that the article will have little effect in reforming degraded students, are deeply thankful that in one breast, at least, still glows that "lofty morality" which "keeps alive the conception of a better state of things." After a prayer for more earnest action and "enthusiasm of the idea," - one cannot help wishing that the writer had a little more enthusiasm for the facts, - we are told that.
There are numerous other ways in which the Nation exerts a bad influence. . . . . It is pessimistic, and accustoms us to an arrogant and self-sufficient style of thought; and we fall into the same habit from reading its columns."
All of which is so good that it deserves the most earnest consideration of the writer.
In conclusion, one cannot but be struck by the fundamental inconsistency of the argument. The object of intellectual life is to discover truth, - "the love of truth for the sake of truth." He admits that the Nation seeks and attains truth, both of fact and opinion, and then asserts that the influence of the Nation is bad, because, to act, we must delude ourselves into believing that things are better than they really are. He asserts that it is better to hold wrong opinions than to have our opinions corrected; in other words, the sole object of life is ideal truth, but the only safe way for us to life is in falsehood and voluntary blindness.
F. J. S.