On October 22, Master Sergeant Joshua L. Wheeler became the first American solider to die in Iraq since 2011. He was killed in a raid by Delta Force personnel and Kurdish Special Forces to free Kurdish hostages of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The raid, requested by the Kurdish regional government, actually freed about 70 different prisoners, all of whom appear to have also been close to execution and 69 of whom were Sunni Arabs. Master Sergeant Wheeler of Oklahoma is survived by his wife and four sons, including an infant.

His death represents a sad reminder of the state of the war against ISIS, and of the situation in Iraq and Syria more broadly. After eight years of American occupation, only three years of disintegration have brought Delta Force operatives back to the country where they first became masters of the night raid. The Pentagon press secretary has suggested that raids like last Thursday’s are not “something that’s going…to happen on a regular basis,” but similar operations have occurred before, most notably in May when a mission in Syria killed ISIS commander Abu Sayyaf. Just Wednesday, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter told Congress that raids would become a centerpiece of American strategy in the region.

Of course, Master Sergeant Wheeler’s sacrifice is of incalculable value to the men he and his comrades rescued. One, Muhammad Hassan Abdullah al-Jibouri, made a special point of thanking the United States and Wheeler during a press conference in which Mr. Jibouri and other prisoners described how the actions and ethnicities of their relatives made them targets of ISIS’s ire. Unfortunately, Mr. Jibouri’s wife and son remain in ISIS territory. One can only hope that Mr. Jibouri’s family will have the opportunity to see him again, unlike Master Sergeant Wheeler’s.

As Secretary Carter’s comments make clear, the United States is still defining its strategy for dealing with ISIS, but the President seems ready to increase direct military involvement. That approach raises serious constitutional issues, chief among which are how Congress has still not managed to authorize these operations and why the Obama administration believes that it does not have to ask Congress for permission. But even more pressing is a practical question: How is it that the U.S. is still tinkering with its policy to such an extent?

Only time will deliver the full answer, but one very clear problem is the wishful thinking that went into a key part of the administration’s initial policy. That crucial component was the $500 million Pentagon program to train a new group of Syrian rebels who would be moderate, pro-Western, and focused primarily on destroying ISIS. Someone creatively dubbed this proposed new Syrian force the “New Syrian Forces.” The goal was to have 5,400 rebels trained in Turkey and back in Syria by the end of the year.

When the first, very small group of 54 of these fighters entered Syria in July, however, the Al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front destroyed them as a fighting force. The video of General Lloyd Austin, in charge of U.S. Central Command, telling Senator Deb Fischer of Nebraska that only “four or five” members of the “New Syrian Forces” remained in fighting shape is fairly excruciating to watch, and provided fodder for comedian John Oliver of Last Week Tonight.

After another group of 75 rebels did their erstwhile compatriots one better by offering American arms to the Nusra Front last month, the Pentagon suspended the training program.

The failure of the “New Syrian Forces” should not have been a surprise. Unfortunately, U.S. history offers numerous versions of a pretty simple lesson: If rebel groups depend upon you entirely for support, they are probably not worth it. President Kennedy learned this lesson with the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. As in Syria, the U.S. relied on training a group of rebels in a third country, in the Cuban case, Guatemala. As in Syria, air support was key; the idea in both situations was that American warplanes would provide enough cover to ensure the rebels’ success.

One difference in Kennedy’s approach was his insistence on secrecy. But that policy bears a similarity to Obama’s emphasis on keeping the U.S.’s footprint as light as possible. In both cases, the desire not to get too heavily involved led both administrations to lend their proxies inadequate support. Of course, the light footprint approach is appropriate in a post-Bush administration, post-Iraq debacle Middle East, but it must rely on allies with proven ability. Effective and motivated fighters do not emerge out of crash courses.

Indeed, even former enemies can be better friends. This lesson is a central one from the surge in Iraq. There, a key part of General Petraeus’s approach was paying about 103,000 Sunnis to cease fighting Americans, and to start pushing out extremist groups. Encouraging former enemies to switch sides requires a specific confluence of circumstances, to say nothing of political will. Petraeus did not get prior approval for his plan. But engineering such a policy will likely be part of the price of peace in Syria.

A better sense of history might have saved the Obama administration from the ignominious failure of the New Syrian Forces. Now that another American has given his life in Iraq, the least we owe him is a less rose-tinted approach to the conflict. Mr. Jibouri’s child will still likely be grappling with the sectarian scars of the region, but better decision-making might be able to ensure that he does that grappling with words instead of arms.

Nelson L. Barrette '17, a Crimson editorial executive, is a history concentrator in Winthrop House. His column appears on alternate Fridays.