It is a shame that Libyan despot Muammar al-Qaddafi, while pontificating in front of the General Assembly this past week about how swine flu originated in a weapons lab, how the Kennedy assassination should be reinvestigated, and how Israel and Palestine should merge to become the nation of “Isratine,” also proposed reforming the United Nations Security Council—not because the concern was unwarranted, but exactly because it deserves attention. The fact that the world’s most powerful security body leaves billions under its purview without real representation is not just fodder for a madman’s ramblings. It is a true scandal, one that the body’s current members should feel an obligation to address.

Upon the UN’s founding, selection of the council’s five permanent members seemed straightforward. Ultimate control would rest with the nations that collectively won the war leading to the body’s creation—to wit, the U.S., U.K., France, the Chinese nationalists, and the Soviet Union. Historically speaking, this was to be expected. Traditionally, the victors of a conflict claim a key stake in any postwar order, a major spoil of victory. As a matter of justice, the legitimacy of this norm certainly warrants debate, but it at least made historical sense.

However, as the years wore on, it became increasingly clear that the council, now charged with preventing a breed of war different from World War II, would likewise face conflicts that involved a different set of nations. As the political scientist John Mueller believes, major war is obsolescent and nearing extinction regardless of the UN’s efforts. Instead, intrastate warfare dominates as of late. Since 1940, the number of ongoing civil wars has skyrocketed, not because more nations experience them, but because the conflicts’ average duration has increased markedly. Meanwhile, state-level security efforts focus less on preventing war and more on limiting the development of specific weapons, most notably nuclear and ballistic missile systems.

The UN has adapted to this shift more successfully than one might suspect. For instance, multiple analyses of the UN peacekeeping system have found it to be quite effective at nationbuilding, and certainly much more effective than the U.S. military. Meanwhile, the UN has helped organize the international treaty system that now bans or limits the use and stockpiling of nuclear, chemical, biological, cluster, and landmine weaponry and created institutions like the International Atomic Energy Agency to help enforce these norms.

The problem arises when enforcement is necessary. Peacekeeping is only possible when the country in question accepts intervention voluntarily, which leaves the people of any given nation at the mercy of their government. When the UN began debating a “responsibility to protect” doctrine to remedy this and provide a framework for protecting populations (militarily and otherwise) from their governments, developing nations reacted swiftly. In the words of former General Assembly president Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann, the doctrine brought to mind “recent and painful memories related to the legacy of colonialism.” And rightly so: Under the current UN charter, the decision to intervene in this manner effectively rests in the hands of five major powers. The legitimacy of a system that lets the rich and well-armed come together and intervene wherever they please, while giving no voice to the regions where these interventions will likely take place, is questionable at the very least.

A similar problem arises in questions of disarmament. The IAEA proved most effective when nations wanted to dismantle their nuclear stockpile of their own volitions, as occurred in post-apartheid South Africa. When a state requires coercive measures like sanctions to deter it, the Security Council must grant approval. Given that the five nations with veto power are also the world’s five biggest nuclear powers and can explicitly play by different rules under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, this is a bit like trying DWI cases in front of a jury of drunkards. A state developing nuclear weapons could be forgiven for refusing to take orders from nations guilty of the same crime many times over.

There are many possible ways for the council to reconfigure its membership to make its decisions more legitimate. Including large nations from currently unrepresented regions, like India, Indonesia, and Brazil, would be a good first start. However, not only do we need more members, but we also need a new membership system that prevents against this lack of representation for whole continents in the future. Further, limiting or eliminating veto power so as to give rotating members a real say is a must. Convincing the Permanent Five to relinquish their grasp on the council will not be easy, but it is essential if the UN is to remain a body that the whole world can take seriously.

Dylan R. Matthews ’12, a Crimson editorial writer, lives in Kirkland House. His column appears on alternate Tuesdays.