CORRECTION APPENDED

Public dissent in the United States has caused increased attacks against civilians and American soldiers in Iraq, according to a recent study by two Harvard economists.

Following months of data collection, Jonathan Monten of the Belfer Center at the Kennedy School of Government and Radha K. Iyengar of the Center for Government and International Studies determined that there was a 5-10 percent increase in insurgent attacks following a spike in anti-war rhetoric.

Monten and Inyengar published their final study this month in the National Bureau of Economic Research.

To reach these conclusions, the authors said they poured over numbers from the Department of Defense, the Brookings Institution Iraq Index, and the Iraq Body Count to determine an accurate estimate of casualties. They then combined that information with automated mentions of resolve-undermining statements as well as major polls to measure public opinion.

The study—“Is there an ‘Emboldenment’ Effect? Evidence from the Insurgency in Iraq”—concludes that “there is a small but measurable cost to open public debate in the form of higher attacks in the short term.”

But the paper quickly denounces the conclusion that public dissent is necessarily bad.

“It was not possible, from the data available, to determine whether insurgent groups increased the overall number of attacks against American and Iraqi targets in the wake of public dissent and debate or simply changed the timing of those attacks,” Monten and Inyengar find.

The most important result of the study, according to the authors, is that the insurgent groups are rational actors responding to a perceived decrease in American resolve “rather than groups driven by ideological concerns with little sensitivity to costs.”

Rather than profoundly modifying the behavior of the media, Monten and Iyengar said that the study should be incorporated into American counterinsurgency strategy.

As Monten and Iyengar describe, the Army had pursued a strategy of seek and destroy with respect to terrorists since General David H. Petraeus took command of American forces in Iraq. This change in leadership represented a measurable, though incomplete, shift in strategy, according to Monten and Iyengar. [SEE CORRECTION]

Iyengar said yesterday that this policy change is deeply rooted in a belief formed in Vietnam that “groups motivated by religious goals are fanatical and not taking into consideration cost and incentive.”

But Monten said the most effective way to fight the insurgents “may be to manipulate them using deterrents.”

“[The military] needs to try and manipulate costs and incentives more, rather than seeking out specific enemies,” Iyengar said.

In their next study, Monten and Iyengar said they expect to analyze these specific deterrents and incentives to use against insurgents.

CORRECTION

The March 14 story, "Study Links Terror, Anti-War Rhetoric," misstated the U.S. Army's approach to terrorists. The Army pursued a strategy of seek and destroy terrorists until General David H. Petraeus took command of American forces in Iraq, not since he did so.