Europe has long been, and remains, a vitally important area of world affairs. However contemporary Europe, or at least the parts of it that belong to the EU and NATO, is usually viewed only in terms of its foreign policy. In America, coverage of European domestic politics and issues is usually limited to, alternately, cheap caricatures of EU bureaucratization or breathless accounts of what America might someday resemble if only people would stop voting for Republicans, driving SUVs, and shopping at Wal-Mart.

Yet close inspection reveals that modern Europe, far from having “solved” the problems of modernity, faces challenges that are, if anything, far more daunting than those faced by America. These challenges are important to understand because Europe has been a great ally to America, and it is manifestly in our interest that it continues to be one.

The most recent crisis of note occurs in Hungary. Its capital city Budapest was plagued by its worst violence since the days of Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and Elvis Presley. The last time Budapest saw rioting of the same scale as it did in mid-September it was directed at the imperialism of the, now thankfully defunct, Soviet Union and was repressed at the cost of several thousand lives. The proximate cause of the most recent rioting, which left over a two hundred people injured and turned large sections of the capital city into a “battleground,” was the leaking of tapes in which the socialist prime minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, admitted that he and his party lied “morning, noon and night” in order to get reelected in April’s elections.

A lying, morally bankrupt, political class that is completely disengaged from reality? Who would have thought. Although some, including the venerable Economist, argue that this crisis reflects a specifically Hungarian problem, the magazine’s own words seem applicable to almost the entirety of modern liberal democracy as it describes “collective denial, inside and outside the country, about the need for reform.” The magazine additionally notes that vitally, and obviously, necessary austerity measures were postponed time and time again because of politicians’ fears that they would turn out to be unpopular with the voting public.

Indeed the most relevant part of the story is not that the socialists lied “morning noon and night,” but that their rivals, the center right Fidesz party, did as well. The socialists did not win the election because they were promising tax cuts and spending increases while the conservatives were promising harsh austerity measures. Indeed Fidesz’s proposals were even more unsound and disengaged from reality; they campaigned on explicit promises of sizable tax cuts and spending increases.

The point here is not to obsessively focus on Hungarian debt and party politics, but to note that, given the standards of the post-communist world, Hungary’s recent history has been rather forgiving. If Hungary is capable of erupting into a full fledged government crisis, with extensive rioting and a nationally prominent Fidesz politician, the mayor of Debrecen Lajos Kosa, warning that “rebellion could break out,” other far more troubled countries, such as Serbia, Bosnia, or the quasi-independent statelet of Kosovo, are as well.

The most critical part of the story, however, revolves around leadership. A man much smarter and more eloquent than me, Vaclav Havel, once noted that the Soviet-backed communist systems were able to endure as long as they did because they essentially bought the acquiescence of the population by mortgaging the future; they kept citizens quiet in the present but the system of doing so could not possibly endure. While not morally comparable to communist dictatorships, even a poorly run democracy such as Hungary is vastly preferable to a well run party-state, it seems that nearly the same process is currently underway in many of the democracies of Europe.

Due to basic strictures of demographics, declining numbers of workers combined with rapidly rising numbers of retirees, virtually all of the pension or social security schemes currently in place in the European Union, and to a lesser extent, the United States, will have to undergo significant changes in order to remain solvent. Few politicians, however, seem to want to be the first to tell the elderly that, in the interest of society, they need to take a large cut in their benefits, delay retirement, or both.

This hesistance is the primary reason why the current situation in Hungary is important. Not because its rioting will prove a “spark” that will lead to some sort of generalized European civil disorder a la 1848, or even because Hungary itself is that critical of a place, but because it is a perfect illustration of the dangers of shortsighted political leadership. Prime Minister Gyurcsány seems hell-bent on staying in power despite losing 18 of 19 counties and 15 of 23 cities in the just-completed local elections, and despite President Laszlo Solyom’s public, and not very veiled, suggestion that parliament oust him.

In order to be truly effective, and in order to help construct a stable political system, democratic political leaders must have a higher calling than a mere desire to hold power, and must also refrain from offering up unrealistic or impossible promises during campaigns. Hungary’s current crisis offers us a particularly clear example as to why.



Mark A. Adomanis ’07 is a government concentrator in Eliot House. His column appears on alternate Thursdays.