In spite of its numerous failures, the United States’ Iraq endeavor has recently produced a notable—albeit unexpected—union of traditionally opposed Shi’a and Sunni Muslims. Instead of being treated as liberators, American troops have become the common enemy for everyone in Iraq except for the reliably pro-U.S. Kurds in the North. The country’s main sects have come together in shared hatred for the U.S. occupation. Indeed, in the face of brutal mutilations of American civilians in the Sunni triangle and the unexpected success of insurgencies in the South last week, America’s nation-building effort has stalled. And the prospect of Iraq becoming a self-sufficient and stable society in the near future is dim.

Regrettably, though, the only way to effectively reestablish order in the cities Iraqi rebels took over last week is to increase our occupational presence and encourage hesitant governments to honor current commitments.

The recent Sunni-Shiite common front has demonstrated that the U.S. military presence in Iraq just isn’t cutting it, especially when the Americans can’t keep effective control of major cities such as Falluja and Ramadi. No longer are occupational troops only forced to quell the small-time operations of Sunni extremists, whose attacks—though demoralizing—were less destructive and more infrequent before the recent assistance of Shiite militia. Rather, the current alliance has resulted in increasing violence and a loss of control in important cities, while continuing to refute President Bush’s rash claims that major combat is over. The situation on the ground confirms fears that a large, expensive, long-term military presence and effective security force is the only solution.

Since the American presence in Iraq has proven so ineffective, U.S. troops should also resist the urge to quickly retake those cities still suffering from the recent insurgency. A hasty response with insufficient troops, which cannot adequately provide the security required, could be disastrous. We must now wait before attempting to regain control. Though allowing the cities to remain in disarray is not desirable, we cannot risk further failures and the loss of additional troops. Military strategists should hold off until the occupying powers are really ready to provide an effective security force. And, once in place, they must pursue a policy which does not tolerate those inciting violence against the occupational troops.

As one American official remarked, the battle in Iraq is no longer one of hearts and minds. It is time to realize that Iraq differs from Europe after World War II, where the victorious nations emerged as revered powers. Unfortunately, the occupational forces have failed to gain the acceptance of the Iraqi people, yet they must still endeavor to fulfill their original aims. The campaign cannot be abandoned in the light of the renewed insurgence, and it is the responsibility of the U.S.-led coalition to ensure a lasting stability.