It’s not quite fair to say that Russia’s recent presidential election was rigged. After all, President Vladimir V. Putin, who coasted to a comfortable victory less than two weeks ago, is extremely popular. Even with the ballot-stuffing, media manipulation and other election irregularities which marred the process, Putin’s 72.1 percent of the vote is still impressive in Russia’s semi-democratic environment. Yet there is still ample cause for concern. Democracy in the world’s largest country is not well—and it is only getting worse.

Never a real innovator, Putin this time around employed electioneering tactics that were pretty predictable—just a little more blatant than in elections past. The ever-compliant press was a little more malleable, broadcasting an entire 29-minute speech Putin gave to campaign staffers. Local leaders were a little more enthusiastic about fixing the results, threatening punishment for not getting to the polls and offering prizes to increase voter turnout and get the 50 percent quorum required to make Putin’s victory official. Workers at polling places were a little more likely to forge a couple thousand votes for Putin than the last time he was running for the top job—as they did in Moscow and elsewhere.

Russia has seen these sorts of irregularities before—in December’s parliamentary elections, where United Russia, a party that doesn’t have much of a platform except unwavering support for Putin, scored a tremendous victory. If this trend continues, the Russian Federation may eventually become about as democratic as Khrushchev was well-balanced.

There is, however, some hope for liberal democracy in Russia. Putin seems genuinely committed to liberalizing the economy—as evidenced by his pre-election appointment of a number of pro-Western reformers to help manage the country’s economy. Putin’s political clout, meanwhile, has allowed him to brush aside many of the once-influential military and intelligence officials who often act more like Kremlin henchmen than civil servants. The super-wealthy “oligarchs” who ruled Russia during the Yeltsin years have also been neutralized. All of these reforms will attract more foreign investment, which is desperately needed in a country historically short of capital. And as long as Putin proceeds to better the business climate—along with Russian civil society and the middle class—the country’s leadership may eventually be forced to suppress its authoritarian instincts.

Now that Putin has consolidated his power, we expect him to follow through with reform: growing the Russian economy, cutting the central bureaucracy and eliminating widespread corruption. And we hope that, eventually, Russians will demand a more democratic election process. But for now, it seems managed democracy is the best the world can expect.