By Susan E. McGregor

Next to November 2, December 13 was the most anticipated day in politics this year. This past Monday marked the day of the Electoral College vote, when the next president of the United States is officially elected. Ironically, it was also the first day of the vote recounts in Ohio—which means that they began at the precise moment when they ceased to be able to impact the outcome of the election. As a result, a perfect political balance has been struck: every vote will be counted, but it’s possible that not all of them will count.

Yet while the initial discord between exit polls and election results on November 2 was puzzling, putting together the pieces since then has turned out to be all too easy. In Ohio, Bush received 3,893 votes-without-voters, while one precinct came out with a final vote tally of negative 25 million. In a sworn affidavit in Perry County, OH, an election poll worker noted 96 more votes than voters at a single precinct. Unfortunately, the list goes on—these are just a few of the stories from one battleground state. But throughout dozens of states— both blue and red—evidence is accumulating that the presidential election results were, at best, deeply flawed. Of course, the thousands of reports of malfunctioning machines and phantom voters have many people using a different f-word: Fraud.

This is not the conclusion of conspiracy theorists, but rather of realists. With the advent of electronic voting systems, a single point of entry into the election system could provide the ability to manipulate millions of votes. Opportunity, of course, does not equal intent. While it is theoretically possible that a group of people attempted to systematically alter the outcome of the presidential election, it is more likely that the real fraud possibility consists of cover-ups of the systemically insecure and inaccurate voting machines employed in most of the country.

At the center of the debate one finds Diebold Elections Systems, Inc. and Election System and Software, Inc. (ES&S), the top two producers of electronic voting equipment in the country. Yet the companies are probably not so much competitors as cohorts. Why would two huge companies in the same industry be bedfellows? Because the president of Diebold Election Systems is Robert Urosevich, and the vice president of election services at ES&S is his brother, Todd. Together, the two companies’ equipment tallied an estimated 80 percent of the popular vote in this year’s election. Curiously enough, besides sharing a bloodline, the brothers’ companies seem to be plagued by the same problem: an apparently hereditary inability to comply with state and federal voting regulations.

In Florida this past June, elections chief Ed Kast promptly resigned after questions were raised as to how the ES&S machines purchased by eleven Florida counties were certified by the state when they did not comply with Florida law, though one may imagine the decision was influenced by the Florida Association of Counties’ (FAC) sole endorsement of ES&S. In turn, it seems possible that the $300,000 in commissions that FAC received from the sales may have convinced them of the very real “value” of that company’s machines. Such a price tag for “product positioning” seems small, however, compared with the $70.6 million ES&S made in sales to Florida following the endorsement. In March ES&S was forced to put up a $10 million bond as insurance against problems and lawsuits, after it was found that in four Indiana counties the company had used uncertified software to move votes from one computer to another—and then attempted to switch back to a certified version “under the guise of routine maintenance” according to a county official. In the end, the counties used the uncertified software because it was found that the certified version did not count the votes correctly. Diebold, on the other hand, was forced to pay $2.6 million outright last month in order to settle a civil lawsuit in California in which the company was also accused of using uncertified software in an election. Not surprisingly, neither company has issued any kind of statement regarding the allegations. And despite the fact that both companies avoided criminal charges, one point remains clear: in terms of security and accountability, they both seem completely irresponsible.

It is not impossible to create effective electronic voting machines. As one may be tempted to wonder, “If I can use an ATM safely, why not an electronic voting machine?” Good question. Because while their track record shows that Diebold and ES&S can’t seem to consistently produce accurate, problem-free electronic voting machines, there are other companies that do. For example, Sequoia Voting Systems, the third largest voting systems company in the country, already employs a system that prints a simultaneous paper ballot with each touch screen vote cast. It is precisely the receipt that currently makes using an ATM safer than a paperless voting machine— the physical, unalterable, readable proof of the transaction. Yet somehow this is something that neither ES&S nor Diebold has managed, despite the fact that more than three-quarters of Diebold’s 2003 revenue was in ATM and similar sales.

Until the effective monopoly of the Diebold and ES&S in the voting systems industry is actually broken, and U.S. lawmakers focus on the need for accountable, auditable voting systems, election fraud will always be a risk. The only solution is continued scrutiny and advocacy. And in the meantime, if you happen to use a Diebold ATM—I suggest you keep your receipt.

Susan E. McGregor ‘05 is a special concentrator affiliated with Quincy House.