Last week, in an impassioned speech before the United Nations, President Bush called on Iraq to comply with international resolutions and allow weapons inspectors to return with unfettered access. This past Monday, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan announced that Baghdad had succumbed to growing pressure and was prepared to allow the unconditional return of the inspectors. Annan hailed the announcement as an astounding turn of events, an “indispensable first step.” Yet the White House—not surprisingly—didn’t seem very happy.

The American response to Iraq’s announcement demonstrates just how backwards this administration’s thought process has become. This administration decided a full year ago it wanted to invade Iraq; last October, Iraq was named a possible Phase Two of the war on terrorism, despite no evidence linking it to al Qaeda. Ever since, the White House has tried vigorously to find a reason to justify invasion. Bringing his case to the U.N. was a gamble, and Bush only took it believing Iraq would never agree to unconditional terms. But now it appears he lost that gamble—just don’t expect him to give up any time soon.

The president’s deeply skeptical response is not surprising considering that for months it has been clear the White House had no intention of accepting anything short of ousting Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. In August, Vice President Dick Cheney called a return of weapons inspectors “dangerous,” saying they would provide “false comfort.”

Weeks ago, after failing to convince any allies other than our obedient British pal, Tony Blair, Bush turned to the U.N. to mollify foreign critics. He did not have much of a choice. It was a last attempt to form a coalition such that an invasion of Iraq would not lead to a backlash and destabilization in the Middle East.

But how badly did Bush lose in his U.N. gamble? Assuming weapons inspectors return to Iraq—and the United States would be hard pressed not to at least give them a chance—it could be as long as eight months before the inspectors made preliminary conclusions, according to a report in the Washington Post. Already Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld has tried to salvage the failure by calling on Congress to give the go-ahead for war regardless of any U.N. resolutions. Without immediate action, Bush will lose the use of the Iraqi invasion as a political weapon in the midterm elections. Bush’s bargain for any semblance of an open-ended U.N. resolution fails now that Iraq, it seems, has audaciously acquiesced.

As much as the White House would like to belittle the significance of the inspections and call Iraq’s agreement yet another empty assurance, the turn of events is far more promising than any blank check resolution giving the go-ahead to his military. An invasion today would lead to massive casualties among the already-suffering Iraqi people, even worse than the appalling civilian deaths in Afghanistan. Furthermore, an invasion today would handicap this administration in fulfilling its duties in the war on terrorism still being waged worldwide. Afghanistan is far from rebuilt, its government is still weak, and Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda are still at large. And with popular opinion in the Middle East equating a war on Iraq with a war on the entire Arab world, there is definite cause for concern that this administration may be rushing the U.S. into a bloody campaign whose regional consequences are not clear.

A regime change in Iraq may one day be necessary, but President Bush must come to understand it is not a question for the U.S. to decide on its own. Hussein is a brutal dictator, and his human rights record is dismal—however, so are the human rights records of many of our so-called allies throughout the world. Furthermore, little is now known about the status of Hussein’s chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. And although the world cannot stand by idly while the regime acquires and develops these weapons, a preemptive, unilateral strike would set an undesirable precedent. Our recent ally Pakistan—which also developed its own nuclear weapons, defying international pressure—could use the same principle of preemption to wage war on India. China could act likewise against Taiwan.

The pending return of weapons inspectors is the most promising step towards disarming Iraq in years, and Bush deserves some of the credit. Many other members of his administration would have refused to consider such a gamble. Many of them were around a decade ago for the previous Bush administration’s war on Iraq and never actually stopped calling for the toppling of Hussein’s government. In time, perhaps, if the case is made and consensus is reached, Hussein will be deposed. Until then, the world must depend on the right combination of patience, pressure and open deliberations—the same democratic principles on which this nation was founded.

Benjamin J. Toff ’05, a Crimson editor, is a social studies concentrator in Winthrop House.