As due dates for term papers approach, students will once again flock to the libraries and ponder pressing questions. Questions like: why is this guy looking in my backpack?

Why is this guy looking in your backpack, indeed? Entering Widener library, a student first must swipe his Harvard ID through a turnstile, which is monitored by a security guard. Then, at the entrance to the stacks, a separate guard inspects the IDs; the Phillips Reading Room also requires ID checks. Upon exiting the library, another guard inspects the contents of bags and the due dates of all library books. Although Widener’s security features are particularly extensive, all Harvard libraries operate similarly. Given the substantial number of employees involved, this represents a serious commitment of Harvard’s resources.

If all 37 Harvard libraries on campus (and there are 90 in the whole system) employed a security guard 12 hours a day for an average 320 days a year—at a rate of at least $10 an hour—this would amount to more than $1.4 million. Beyond that, some of the libraries use multiple door-checkers (Widener employs at least four, Lamont at least two) and many employ professional guards who are paid more than the low-end rate of $10 an hour. Furthermore, many libraries are open more than 320 days a year. As a result, the sums involved are probably significantly higher.

The huge allocation for security begs an assessment of the system’s efficacy. Although the security measures are well-intentioned, the current system goes too far—wasting resources and agitating students, while adding little to the overall security of the library.

For example, a simple improvement could be made at Lamont and Cabot science libraries by installing a turnstile to check IDs rather than employing an additional security guard. This measure has already proven effective at Widener and Langdell library at the Law School.

The more significant problem concerns the superfluous bag checks at the library exits. At most libraries, if not all, magnetic sensors detect materials that have not been checked out. So what is the rationale for additional checks?

Harvard College Library spokesperson Beth Brainard says the checks are a means of double-checking the machines and preventing thefts of pages torn from library books. She also says the value of Harvard’s collections mandate this high level of security. But as a means of achieving these goals, the door checks are largely ineffective.

Often the checkers simply glance at one compartment of a backpack or skip the check altogether. For all the double-checking, it would be easy enough to hide a book in other compartments or jacket pockets. Furthermore, anything short of patting down library patrons as they exit will do little to catch thieves who have torn out pages.

The answer is not to toughen up bag checks. Given that access to the library is controlled, the number of potential thefts is small. Also, the most valuable books Harvard owns are not in the general stacks. These rare and expensive books are kept securely in special collections and have their own security measures. The bag checks simply act as an unnecessary annoyance to library patrons.

The resources currently expended on these inefficient security measures could be put to better use. Certain initiatives need funding even within the library system, including the proposal for an extension of Lamont’s hours. Streamlining security would not only save money but, most relevantly, it would make students’ lives easier. Maybe then we could devote more library time to studying and less to checking in and out.

—ERIN M. KANE