The latest literary effort by Henry A. Kissinger ’50, “Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st century,” sheds little light on the latest round of controversy of which he is the center. In fact, a skeptical reader might say it sheds little light on anything at all.

The fifteenth book written or edited by the man who wrote the longest undergraduate thesis at Harvard is itself most notable for its attempt to play it safe.

Unlike his memoirs it is not nearly as much his draft of history—it is hard to accuse him of partial and selective history-making in a book where he focuses almost exclusively on prescriptions for the future. Except for a section that discusses and dismisses the notion of universal jurisdiction, there is also little to connect the book to the argument offered by Christopher Hitchens, author of the new book The Trial of Henry Kissinger, that Kissinger is a “war criminal.”

And while Kissinger’s book may (as the New York Times’ Thomas Friedman suggests) represent a middle course that avoids the pitfalls of both the American Left and Right, it cannot provide what is a necessary synthesis of the old—Kissinger’s typical balance of power geopolitical intuition—with the new—what Kissinger calls the “New Age” issues such as the environment, the economics of globalization, and human rights.

Since Kissinger can hardly hide his disdain for these new issues, the best he does is to again choose the safe course. He covers his bases by paying lip-service to the emerging emphasis on human rights and other new issues, accepting them only as fait accompli.

The book is divided into seven chapters that deal with, in order, America’s role in the world, Europe, the Western Hemisphere, Asia, the Middle East and Africa, globalization and the enforcement of human rights. It is the typical Kissingerian approach, dividing the world up into neat geopolitical spheres each suitable to a policy of Realpolitik.

The only modification is that he elevates in importance the questions of globalization and “Peace and Justice” by granting them space equal to one of the other spheres.

But the organization actually belies Kissinger’s unstated bias—by treating globalization and human rights as yet two more spheres in which to strategize, he puts them on a level beneath the universal dictates of geopolitics: national interest, stability of the system and great power politics.

His prescriptions for Europe are uncharacteristically bland and uncontroversial. Following a run-through of the history of the nation-state, Kissinger explicates the details of a strategy whose main point is the avoidance of combinations of enemies.

Kissinger heightens anticipation by citing an increase in discord among our allies, but in the end only calls for more sensitive policies and rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic. The threat is that parties will be forced to act against their own long-term interest in dissolving the Atlantic alliance, and the medicine is the slow and well-considered expansion of NATO (gauged by geopolitical necessities), a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area, and continued engagement with the European Union.

Kissinger includes the required argument in favor of a national ballistic missile shield here, but it is not his best effort. His explanation of why he urged Nixon to sign the anti-ballistic missile treaty sounds fishy (he says he was against it but the administration was backed into the treaty by domestic pressure), and he does a far better job of outlining the arguments against a shield than in rebutting them.

He concludes that the shield will eventually work, does not contradict nuclear doctrine and will neither decouple the U.S. from Europe’s defense nor promote proliferation—but he fails to explain convincingly why the shield should be a top priority.

At one point he points out that even if a missile shield provoked a race with countries whose arsenal is at the limit of the shield’s capacity, it would be a race that the U.S would eventually win—but there’s no consideration of what the cost of such a race would be, and how that figures into the national interest.

Moving on to the Western Hemisphere, Kissinger says the overall question is how the U.S. can bring about a regime of free-trading, internally stable and externally sated powers while preventing the emergence of rival blocs. Kissinger takes a fairly detailed approach, but again while the prescriptions are coated in allusions to visionless American policy, they are themselves either vague or totally mired in the details.

Kissinger’s chapters on Asia, the Middle East and Africa follow a similar format, made repetitive by atrocious section titles (“Relations with China: The Historical Context,” followed by “Relations with China: The Strategic Context”)—sharp analysis of the historical moment the region finds itself in, explanations of how the concerns of balance of power and national interest apply, followed finally by his prescriptions.

In Asia, he explains that we cannot let the North Koreans use America to pressure the South Koreans, that we must affirm our ties to Japan and that we should carefully continue to explore the possibility of cooperation with China (while being sure not to push them too hard on Taiwan, human rights, or the other issues generated by American public sentiment).

In the Middle East, he again says patience is the key. He implicitly blames Clinton’s quest for a legacy for the collapse of the peace process, and demands that the U.S. walk a tightrope, being sure not to play a role in pushing too hard for agreements, but at the same time retaining its trusteeship of the region.

In Africa, Kissinger begins by admitting that the U.S. has no geopolitical interest on the continent. He leaves the continent to the world community, explaining, “[Africa] should be turned into a test of the ability of the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, other international institutions, and the private sector to cooperate in the pursuit of universal goals.”

But Kissinger’s generosity in turning over the keys to the continent only highlights his failure to deal with the occasion when morality, economics, and geopolitics all conflict to different degrees.

The necessary balancing is explained in neither of the subsequent chapters on economics and human rights. The chapter on globalization says little other than that globalization might influence the way nation-states act in the international system, that it’s another factor that can cause states to deviate from the pool-ball like predictable physics of national self-interest.

Kissinger begins his chapter on Peace and Justice with the following phrase: “Probably the most dramatic transformation in the nature of contemporary international affairs has been the general acceptance of the proposition that certain universal principles are deemed enforceable.”

The phrase sums up his approach to these issues. Kissinger steadfastly refuses to enter into the question of whether these principles are important enough to ever outrank geopolitics, instead presenting them as esoteric details imposed on statesmen by an ignorant public. He never enters into the question of where national interest comes from and dodges the argument that it is these domestic preferences that gives statesmen and geopolitics its direction.

The result is that Kissinger focuses entirely on the question of enforcement and jurisdiction. He argues that international tribunals should be closely overseen and deems jurists’ attempts to extend their jurisdiction across borders a threat to national sovereignty, global civil society or not.

While both stances are consistent with Kissinger’s brand of realism, intended to prioritize peace over justice, Hitchens sees more selfish motivations.

Hitchens says Kissinger feels personally endangered by the threat of universal jurisdiction. Though Hitchens admits that Kissinger is unlikely to be tried as a war criminal, Hitchens maintains that the fear of possible prosecution or involvement in civil action is on Kissinger’s mind. Indeed, Kissinger left France after a French judge issued a summons for the former secretary to be questioned about the disappearance of French citizens in Chile.

The claim that Kissinger’s fear influenced his political argument stems from a broader inquiry Hitchens makes into Kissinger’s celebrity status—an inquiry that relates closely to Kissinger’s new book.

“The thing which irritates me most generally, is the extent to which because of his celebrity, Kissinger gets away with things,” Hitchens said. “His actions are judged by reputation, not the other way around,” Hitchens said.

Kissinger’s international consulting work at his firm Kissinger Associates is a product of this reputation, Hitchens says.

Reading Kissinger’s book, one gets the feeling that Hitchens’ criticism should serve as an important warning. Though the elder statesman’s eyes may be fading his readers’ should remain as critical as ever.

—Staff writer David H. Gellis can be reached at gellis@fas.harvard.edu.