Once Slobodan Milosevic surrendered April 1 after a shootout with Serbian police, there was little doubt that he would eventually be held responsible for his actions during the long years of war in the former Yugoslavia. The only question was where he should stand trial. The Serbian government under President Vojislav Kostunica has resisted extraditing the former dictator to the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague, insisting that he be tried in Serbia for alleged crimes including corruption and abuse of power. Yet the Milosevic government’s atrocities against Muslims in Bosnia and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are crimes against humanity, not only against the laws of Serbia, and he should confront his accusers in the international tribunal.

Although Milosevic may be guilty of abusing his power as president of Serbia, he is also responsible to the world community for his alleged acts of genocide. By punishing Milosevic in the world’s court, the Hague would be setting a strong precedent and a deterrent to other world leaders. It is essential that Milosevic be arrested, given a fair trial and sentenced harshly if found guilty. It would be a further atrocity if a man who attempted genocide were to escape the strictest punishment. Leaving Milosevic to serve a sentence in Serbia, on the premise that all prisons are alike, would fail to send the proper precedent and would risk his release should his supporters eventually return to power.

Though the U.S. has a strong interest in strengthening the Kostunica government, it should still exert significant diplomatic pressure on Serbia to ensure that Milosevic will face justice. Failing to insist on this point would send a signal to future war criminals that they do not need to fear extradition so long as the government that succeeds them is democratically elected.

Yet the U.S. must be very selective in the pressure that it applies. Trade sanctions, often the favorite tool of the U.S. for influencing other governments, would have their most immediate effect on the Serbian people rather than their government and would be too far blunt a tool. Instead, as it did to obtain Milosevic’s arrest, the United States should link its direct financial aid to the Serbian government to Milosevic’s speedy extradition. The U.S. could legitimately cut its aid if the Serbian government were to deny Milosevic to the Hague, and placing a specific and tangible penalty behind its demand would send a clear message that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal will be enforced.

The Serbian government may not be very receptive to American ultimatums, nor does it want to be seen as easily susceptible to demands made by the West. While the United States is urging the Serbian government to hand over Milosevic, the international community, especially Russia, Greece and other states more friendly to Serbia, should also use diplomatic and financial pressure to encourage Milosevic’s extradition. Pressure from the international community as a whole would be better received by the Serbian government and people than unilateral U.S. action—and given that Milosevic’s trial is in the interests of world justice, every country has the responsibility to help see justice done.