Although the Kosovo conflict seems to be taking on a life of its own, the NATO allies must be sure to keep their actions directed towards the vision of the world they want to create after the shooting has stopped. Such a vision has never been articulated by NATO or the Clinton Administration, and one must be present before we escalate our forces in the area. If Kosovo cannot come to peace, there is no point fighting a war there. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has clearly articulated a set of goals necessary before any cease-fire; it is up to NATO to enact policies which will achieve them.

On April 9, Annan announced a peace proposal which would stop the bombing once Yugoslavia withdrew its military forces from Kosovo and allowed the return of refugees. It also would have required an international peacekeeping force in Kosovo after Yugoslavia's withdrawal. Annan's proposal is sound; it makes clear that the aim of the NATO intervention is not to punish Yugoslavian civilians but to protect the civilians violently uprooted in Kosovo. Without the return of refugees and the removal of Yugoslav Army units, those who wish to see an Albanian-free Kosovo will have triumphed.

However, the U.N. proposal was officially turned down on April 16. Yugoslav diplomats said that the nation would not withdraw its troops until the bombing had ceased, in essence asking NATO to make the first move. In addition, Yugoslavia would allow only civilian observers, not military forces, into Kosovo. These conditions are unacceptable. The expulsion of the Albanians demonstrates that Milosevic cannot be relied on to obey international human rights conventions, so his compliance with international agreements may be unsteady. If the bombing stopped first, Yugoslavia could easily delay the withdrawal of troops long enough to continue its ethnic cleansing, and it would be politically near-impossible to restart the strikes with this delay as the only justification. Furthermore, civilian observers will not be enough: The ethnic cleansing currently taking place makes it clear that the Kosovar Albanians deserve military protection from Yugoslav rule.

The question now is how NATO can bring its vision of the world after the war to fruition. Circumstances on the ground do not look promising. Over the last week, the exodus of Kosovar Albanians has resumed on an intermittent basis, despite what NATO describes as the increasing effectiveness of the bombing campaign. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees now estimates that 670,000 of the 1.8 million Kosovar Albanians have been forced from their homes since March 1998, and it seems likely that the aim of the Yugoslav Army is to expel the entire civilian population.

To achieve its ends of protecting the Albanian population, NATO must be able to weaken Yugoslavia's will faster than the Yugoslav Army can expel civilians. Those far outside of the military cannot possibly estimate the true effectiveness of the bombing or by how much the expulsions have been slowed. However, if bombardment from the air can no longer work faster than the ethnic-cleansers on the ground, the strategy needs reexamination.

Even if NATO erred in beginning its bombing campaign, as some allege, recognition of that fact cannot give Albanians back their homes. NATO must concentrate on finding the right means to achieve its ends; if air strikes are insufficient for this purpose, we would support the use of NATO ground troops in Kosovo to protect the Kosovar Albanians, to return the refugees to their homes, and to and secure their safety.