The military strikes in Yugoslavia must be allowed to run their course. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's call for cease-fires and his government's declaration that "peace has been restored in Kosovo" are belied by the brutal treatment of the Kosovar Albanians. Reports vary, but it seems certain that several hundred thousand Kosovars have been forced from their homes into neighboring republics, while many more are refugees within their own borders.

While the NATO allies should actively pursue all avenues to a peaceful resolution, Yogoslavia's overtures will not represent an honest desire for peace until the persecution of the Kosovar Albanians has stopped.

Many have criticized the air strikes for solidifying Molosevic's power. Perhaps, if the air strikes had not occurred, Milosevic would eventually have fallen; but the Kosovar Albanians did not have that long to wait. According to statements by the German Defense Ministry, a plan for the expulsion of the Kosovar Albanians had been implemented in October 1998, even as Milosevic agreed to peace talks, with U.S. diplomats, and has continued since under the guise of strike against the pro-independence Kosovo Liberation Army.

NATO's air attacks are therefore not responsible for the expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo but instead only caused a planned operation of ethnic cleansing to begin sooner rather than later. In any case, the NATO strikes could never be truly responsible; Serb troops, not stealth fighters, are forcing people from their homes.

In the past few days, the flow of refugees into Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro has slowed from the flood of the previous weeks. The bordering nations and international relief agencies have begun the task of caring for the dispossessed; the U.S. and other NATO nations must do as mush as possible to assist them.

Rather than airlifting 20,000 refugees to Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, the U.S. is wisely considering the alternative of providing direct assistance to the bordering nations, such as building barracks for the refugees in Albania. Increased assistance would also help to rebuild Albania's shattered economy and improve their ability to shelter the refugees.

However, the refugee slowdown is an ominous rather than positive development. Last week, the Yogoslav Army sealed the border to prevent refugees from escaping, although it has since reopened for brief intervals. It is impossible to know where the several hundred thousand "internally displaced" Kosovars are, or whether they have adequate food or shelter. There are no reliable sources of information on the ground within Kosovo, but refugees tell of a meticulous and organized refugees tell of a meticulous and organized effort to empty cities, towns and villages.

Even more disturbing are reports that the Serbs may be mining the Albanian border and aerial photographs which show freshly turned earth resembling the mass graves dug during the Bosnian war. According to CBS, NATO reports spotting 96 freshly dug graves from the air over Kosovo last Saturday night and Sunday.

The despicable actions of the Yogoslav forces fly in the face of Milosevic's protestations for peace and make it clear that, at least for the foreseeable future, it will be impossible for the Kosovar Albanians to live safely under Yugoslav control. An autonomous Kosovo will require the protection of an international force; even if the current conflict remains air-based, some type of ground forces, U.S. or otherwise, must eventually become involved after the fighting has ceased.

From the position of an armchair general, it is difficult to know whether an air war is enough; however, it would be wise to maintain the use of ground troops as an option. Doing otherwise would send the signal that the U.S. is prepared to punish genocide only when the perpetrators are easy targets for bombardment.

There is no obvious solution, no clear precedent for stopping genocide within a country's borders. However, the years of waiting in Bosnia and Rwanda provide a strong precedent of what doesn't work--and it's time to try something else. NATO must take care to avoid unnecessarily alienating other nations or splitting the alliance, and it must keep in mind that all wars are only methods of achieving peace.

But the question now is not whether NATO should have taken an interest in the Balkans in the first place, or whether idealism is superior to realpolitik; the question is how to avoid the genocide of the Kosovar Albanians, and whether NATO is willing to take the necessary steps to that end.