Mired by economic strife, political corruption and ethnic tensions, the Russian government has done little over the last decade to earn the widespread support of either the international community or its own citizens. Yet, in the past three months the Kremlin has manufactured a stunning comeback, at least in the eyes of the Russian people.

In September, some of the largest terrorist bombs ever repeatedly rocked Moscow--clearly challenging the psychological security of Russians. Though it is uncertain who planted these bombs, Russia has claimed it was Chechen terrorists and has used the guise of "anti-terrorist action" to launch a brutal offensive against the region of Chechnya. The charge of blame against Chechens is unverified, so far, but the campaign has garnered the approval of 60 to 80 percent of the Russian people.

In a country where, in 1996, 50 percent of Russians supported Chechen independence, the current approval ratings represent more than a drastic shift in public opinion. Instead, they represent the return of Soviet style tactics of governmental deception, press censorship and ethnic intolerance--all of which are used to maintain support for the Chechen conflict. They undermine the Russian government's claim that it is just following democratic precepts by following the will of the people.

What will bring an end to the Chechen conflict is the same thing that is fueling it right now--public opinion. Yet, neither the international community, nor Russians themselves, will be able to accurately assess the true dangers of the current Chechen conflict without truthfulness on two fronts.

In the first place, in order to accurately judge the Chechen conflict, Russian citizens must be able to trust their government. The Soviet military machine was notorious for lying about the extent of casualties--both military and civilian--and this tendency to exaggerate military accomplishments has been readily adopted by the new regime. After the 1996 campaign in Chechnya was over, Russian President Boris Yeltsin admitted to a death toll significantly higher than that reported during the war and it is widely assumed that the Russian government is again intentionally underestimating casualties in order to bolster civilian support. Indeed, independent sources estimate that military casualties are nearly as high as they were during the failed Soviet campaign in Afghanistan in 1978-1979.

Moreover, an informed public opinion relies upon truthfulness from the press. Yet, this truthfulness is complicated by the fact that the Russian government enjoys a virtual monopoly over mass media. The government has severely restricted live coverage of the events in Chechnya on national television, effectively keeping millions of Russians uninformed of catastrophic civilian casualties. More troublesome is that the Russian government has restricted foreign and independent news agencies' access to Chechnya as well. Most of the Russian government's claims about the Chechen conflict cannot be independently corroborated, meaning that the Russian people--and the world--are basing their opinions almost entirely on the Russian government's questionable and highly politicized accounts of the truth.

Indeed, with the humanitarian stakes in Chechnya as high as they are, the world must be able to respond to the Chechen conflict in an informed and intelligent manner. The Russian government may be concerned about creating a favorable image before Yelstin's successor is elected next year, and it may be concerned with regaining lost pride after a decade of impotence. But, as citizens of a nation that purports to uphold democratic ideals, the Russian people have a right to the truth about what is happening in Chechnya.