Senate Was Correct Not to Rubber Stamp Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

To the editors:

It may be reasonable to compare the fate of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919-1920 with that of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999, as did Shawn P. Saler '03 (Opinion, Oct. 18). But the implications of such a comparsion are not necessarily what Saler makes them out to be.

Among other things it is important to keep in mind that the Treaty of Versailles was, put simply, a historical disaster. The League of Nations covenant was only one of its many ill-conceived provisions: while noble in theory, the League was so poorly implemented that even had the United States joined, it is unclear whether anything substantive would have come of it.

At the same time, the harsh conditions imposed on Germany at Versailles--including the infamous "war guilt" clause--clearly led to the resurgence of German nationalism. That the United States did not ratify the agreement shows nothing more than that the Senate in 1920 recognized a bad treaty when it saw one. Perhaps if our European allies had followed our example and tried to work out a more equitable agreement, the catastrophes of the subsequent two decades might have been avoided.

Now as then, the United States Senate should not be in the business of rubber-stamping flawed agreements simply because the prevailing winds of international opinion are blowing in the same direction.

It was obvious in 1919 that the Allies needed to sign a peace with Germany, but far from obvious that the Treaty of Versailles was the best peace that could have been arranged.