Nuclear containment is one of the most important and difficult tasks facing the international community today. Tight control of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union poses the most challenging part of the problem.

Last week, President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin met to discuss the transfer of uranium-enriching materials from Russia to Iran. While these materials could be used for nuclear power, Iran could also use them to create enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

The fine line between weaponry and energy production has been a point of contention throughout half a century of slow nuclear proliferation. We don't think we need to enumerate the reasons for ending the spread of nuclear weapons. However, the issue of nuclear power is much harder to resolve.

Non-nuclear nations argue that denying them nuclear power is equivalent to stunting their economic development. Such a prohibition could also be viewed as an act to solidify cultural superiority.

But the nuclear community has denied many nations nuclear power with good reason. Accountability and openness are necessarily the hallmarks of a new nuclear program in an independent state. Without these two crucial elements, the danger of development of nuclear weapons will always be present.

If a nation is unwilling to provide absolutely complete access to United Nations observers in all of its nuclear facilities, other countries have every right to deny that nation nuclear power. Any discussion of an `international invasion of privacy' must defer to a far more pressing issue; a nuclear unknown quantity poses a security risk to every other nation in the world.

In the case of Russia and Iran, we believe that nuclear power should be unavailable to Iran until that nation is willing to provide disclosure to the U.N. of its entire nuclear program, for the duration of that program. Iran's history has not been one of openness and non-aggression; nothing short of full compliance should allow it to gain nuclear privileges.

One problem still pervades the proliferation of nuclear power. Assurances of openness at the beginning of a foreign nuclear program do not necessarily mean that openness will continue. If a country gains nuclear power and later closes its sites to U.N. inspectors, the damage has intractably been done.

This issue makes past histories an even more significant indicator of the ability to responsibly use nuclear power. If a nuclear situation does become uncontrollable, the use of force may be necessary to address the problem.

We hope that Russia will consider Iran's willingness to comply with U.N. observers before it makes a clearly lucrative deal to sell equipment for nuclear power. If Russia completes the sale without assurances--and these should be manifold given Iran's past--the Western nuclear community should institute sanctions against Russia to prevent any further sales.

The Russians are in a strong bargaining position, but they could become too pliable in the face of Iran's vast oil wealth. To make Russia's decision easier, the U.N. should offer extra financial incentives to Russia in return for a contract prohibiting non-U.N.-approved transfers of nuclear equipment. In this case, prevention is worth the price.