The war in Bosnia, Europe's bloodiest conflict since the Second World War, has come to a halt. As many as 200,000 people have been slain in this brutal conflict, and two million more have lost their homes. Even more disturbing than these grim statistics is the character of the brutalies of the war. Systematic executions of civilians, mass rapes and concentration camps--atrocities that the continent had hoped it had left behind forever--belied the west's hopes for a brighter future after the Cold War. This optimism may now have a new lease in the wake of the Bosnian peace accord, provided that the signatories and their allies in peace can preserve the tenuous agreement ending this four-year conflict.

The peace represents a compromise hammered out in marathon negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, between the presidents of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia, under the auspices of Secretary of State Warren Christopher and his chief negotiator, Assistant Secretary Richard C. Holbrooke. While the accord does not represent a victory for justice, it offers far more hope to the peoples of Bosnia than the continuation of a war whose only certainty would be more death. The accord preserves a unified Bosnia within internationally recognized borders, even while it vests substantial political authority in the two republics that divide the country, the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic. Sarajevo will remain a united capital under Federation control, international monitors will supervise free elections and the protection of human rights and no one charged with war crimes will be allowed to hold political office.

The initialing of the international peace accord at an Air Force base in the American heartland is a powerful demonstration of the role America still plays in managing European security. After years of wavering from the promises of his 1992 election campaign, President Clinton made the decision in late July that the time had come for the war in Bosnia to end. Clinton stiffened the resolve of our NATO allies and launched Holbrooke's diplomatic mission into the heart of the war. Aided by Croatian military victories in early August and a powerful NATO air assault several weeks later, the American mission convinced the Serbs that time was finally working against them. The result was the Dayton conference where after weeks of secluded talks and intense American pressure, the three Balkan presidents managed to agree on a compromise settlement.

While the conclusion of the agreement is a cause for jubilation, the problems in translating this paper into reality are formidable. The leaders of the Bosnian Serbs authorized Serbian President Milosevic to represent their people at the Dayton talks, but have since expressed their dissatisfaction with the content of the peace. Much of their talk is the bluster of men who had to make substantial concessions in the peace, yet there remain local Serb leaders who may resist certain provisions, particularly those that call for turning over Serb-controlled suburbs of Sarajevo to the Federation government.

While the Serbs may be the most likely resistors to the peace, there still remains the substantial prospect of rifts in the Muslim-Croat alliance. The two sides fought each other in the early years of the war, and it was only their mutual antipathy toward the Serbs that brought them together. Progress on joint Muslim-Croat institutions has been slow, and the promises to return refugees to their homes within Federation territory have gone largely unfulfilled. Many Bosnian Croats harbor hopes to unite their territory with a "Greater Croatia," and much will depend upon whether European economic inducements can encourage Croatian President Franjo Tudjman to support the success of the Federation.

America and her European allies were essential in concluding the peace, and they will remain essential in making it last. NATO has drawn up plans for committing some 60,000 of its ground troops as Bosnian peacekeepers. The force's mission will be to supervise the provisions of the ceasefire and ensure that the combatants withdraw to established lines. Without an international presence on the ground, mutual distrust would in all likelihood lead to a breakdown in the fragile accord. The NATO force guarantees each side that the peace will be upheld and has the strength to enforce it should opposition emerge.

President Clinton has bravely risked his political future in committing at least 20,000 American troops to serve in the American-led NATO force. While the president will no doubt gain from a successful American mission in Bosnia, he risks far more should our forces become embroiled in a renewed conflict. That said, the risks to this mission are well worth it. Fighting in Bosnia destabilized many of the emerging democracies in the region; it threatened to embroil American allies, such as Greeece and Turkey, in a wider war; and it raised questions about the potency of international organizations such as NATO and the United Nations. This is to say nothing of the human tragedy that captured the conscience of the west. While America could not allow itself to engage its ground troops in the war, it must stand by the peoples of Bosnia as they struggle for peace.