Through the medium of ballot initiatives in the most recent elections, the voters of Massachusetts made their voices heard on several different issues. But now it appears that several parties--simply because they don't like the results of the democratic process in this particular case--just aren't willing to listen to the people.

Two weeks ago on this page, we came out against attempts by the City of Cambridge to subvert the abolition of rent control called for by the recent passage of Question 9. But now it appears that the opponents of rent control have thought up yet another way of stalling its repeal.

In this newest attempt to confound democracy, another branch of government has entered the fray. The state referendum repealing rent control won't be able to take effect until the courts decide whether the conduct of the vote was constitutional, a Suffolk Country appellate judge ruled last Friday.

Appeals Court Associate Justice Christopher J. Armstrong refused to life an earlier restraining order preventing Question 9 from taking effect. Interestingly enough, only this question was challenged by Armstrong, who threw out the restraining order covering four other ballot initiatives.

The reason for the original restraining order issued by Suffolk Country Superior Court Judge Hiller B. Zobel '53 was the mere existence of a constitutional challenge to the election results.

Both Zobel and Armstrong concede that the success of such a challenge is by no means certain. But because the challenge may have some chance of success, an entire policy change endorsed by a majority of state voters must be put on hold for an undetermined period of time.

In principle, it is wrong to use the courts as a political weapon against the legitimate expression of the popular will. Testing the constitutionality of controversial new laws is important in upholding the checks and balances that keep our government functioning. However, constitutionality is not at stake in abolishing rent control, as attested by the fact that Cambridge has been without it in the past. Bringing the law to court in this instance is purely procedural--and political.

Furthermore, we believe the constitutional challenge to the conduct of the vote lacks serious merit. Those challenging the vote allege that the anti-rent control result must be disregarded because printed summaries of ballot questions were not provided on the ballots themselves.

But Secretary of State Michael J. Connolly, who conducted the vote, provided separate paper summaries of the questions at polling sites throughout the state. The reason this step was taken was due to the length and complexity of the nine questions. This step was permitted because of the passage of a state law acknowledging the legitimacy of the change.

It is interesting to note that the challenge to the announced policy of providing separate paper summaries at polling sites did not make itself heard in a major way until after the results of the ballot questions came back. We wonder: If the results of the initiatives had been different, would these parties have been so incensed? Clearly the dispute is not about procedure; it's about politics.

The principle behind the restraining order was not consistently applied, focusing only on rent control. Armstrong's decision to single out rent control makes no sense. The reason for making an exception of the issue, according to Armstrong, was that allowing Question 9 to take effect would have negative consequences for residents in Cambridge, Boston and Brookline.

But allowing other ballot questions to take effect could also have adverse consequences for Massachusetts residents. Even people on the side of the plaintiffs bringing the constitutional challenge disagree with Armstrong's decision to consider each question as a discrete matter.

"We think it's not appropriate to look at the questions individually," said Ruth A. Bourquin, one of two attorneys representing the plaintiffs challenging the referendums. "All the citizens and voters are irreparably harmed if laws that were inappropriately voted on take effect."

For a judge to make his decisions based on pragmatic rather than constitutional or legal reasons has serious problems. One could argue that allowing rent control to remain in place has adverse consequences for those citizens forced to accept substandard rents for their property--even after the voters of the state found such a situation to be unjust.

The precedent that the restraining order establishes is a dangerous one. Any time a given party receives referendum results they disagree with, they can concoct some allegation of improper conduct, even one without any merit.

The institution of the referendum's results must be delayed until the courts have the time to formally throw out the challenge. And even after their specious charges have been thrown out, the parties can always appeal.

We admit that undoing the results of repealing rent control, if the conduct of the election were found to be unconstitutional, would be a logistic nightmare. But there are other factors to consider, factors that go well beyond pragmatic considerations.

The charges of unconstitutional conduct lack merit. Furthermore, they were applied quite selectively in this case, for no good reason. Question 9 should be allowed to take effect as called for under state law. The ability of the losing side to dig up procedural technicalities is no reason for the stalling of a policy change approved by a majority of the people. Democracy cannot be put on hold indefinitely.