Editor's note: This is the second of a two-part series on the Republican party.

THE DOOMSAYERS are at it again. Many political watchers--both liberal and conservative--have marked Patrick J. Buchanan's candidacy as the beginning of the end for the Bush presidency.

Part retribution for Bush's deviations from Reaganism and part fulfillment of long-held fears about his moderate Republicanism, a revolt on the Right does indeed seem to be brewing. Many conservatives find commentator-turned-candidate Buchanan an eager and capable tool to use in drawing Bush back to the Right--and perhaps evicting him from office.

Others, however, dismiss Buchanan as a crank who stands no chance on a national level and who seems to be a "David Duke without the peroxide." What is the truth? Is this man a threat to the head of his own party, or merely an irresponsible columnist who has grown too big for his britches? Probably the latter. Here's why.

TO HIS CREDIT, Buchanan, by most accounts, is considered to be a serious challenger. His nationally broadcast shows on CNN and his widely syndicated newspaper column have given him a loyal audience, with particularly strong backing among the Republican Right.

In addition, Buchanan qualified for federal matching funds faster than any candidate since the funding system was implemented in the '70s. In fact, he has already outraised Governor Moonbeam (Jerry Brown), though he still has a long way to go to catch Bush ($700,000 versus $10 million).

And most recently, all of the president's weaknesses have seemed to play to Buchanan's advantage since he is the only conservative challenger in the race (a certain neo-Nazi notwithstanding).

In pivotal New Hampshire, Buchanan enjoys surprisingly strong support. This is partly due to New Hampshire voters' disaffection with Bush, partly due to the appeal of the poison of protectionism which Buchanan preaches and partly due to the support of The Manchester Union-Leader, New Hampshire's foremost newspaper. In short, when one looks below the surface, Buchanan seems to pose a credible threat to Bush.

A closer analysis, however, reveals that Buchanan is not the one to capture conservative voters. To begin with, his complete lack of elective experience and his questionable statements on race and immigration make for a weak candidacy. Even more importantly for his election hopes, however, are his differences with most conservatives on the issues of free trade, America's role abroad and Israel.

While Buchanan's lack of experience in elective office may very well make him a better person than most politicians, that does not qualify him to sit in the Oval Office. Any student of government knows the value of political alliances, a seasoned staff and prior experience in dealing with everything from foreign leaders to Congress to the federal bureaucracy.

Buchanan served as a speechwriter in the Nixon White House, as an aide in the Ford transition and as Reagan's director of communications. Wow. Several Harvard professors, including Professors Roger B. Porter, Martin S. Feldstein '61 and Robert D. Putnam have served in much higher posts, and I wouldn't want to see any of them as president, either. (Well, maybe Marty.)

Still, many conservatives are happy to hear at least part of what Buchanan is saying. Yet unless he puts his proposals into practice (or, of course, causes Bush to adopt them), his impact as a candidate is not much greater than his impact as a columnist/commentator has been.

To put these proposals into practice, he needs to be able to work within the structure of government. Those who would disagree have the specter of Jimmy Carter (shudder) as a man who campaigned against Washington and tried to govern without it as well. A Buchanan presidency would be similar in terms of its ultimate effectiveness (i.e., nil).

As for his questionable statements, they don't necessarily impugn his character--but they do call his judgment into question. A litany of offensive remarks have been credited to Buchanan by friends and critics alike in recent months. Even William F. Buckley, a hero of Buchanan, found it "impossible to defend [Buchanan] from the charge of anti-Semitism."

Yet while the cranky columnist complains about the Israeli "amen corner," he had been, until the onset of the Intifada, an advocate of a pro-Israel policy. The Intifada, he argues, convinced him that there were strong arguments against Israeli claims.

What I suggest is that seeming contradictions in Buchanan's record exist. At the very least, Buchanan's oft-quoted statements reveal poor judgment. That alone is a significant strike against him.

To go further and argue that Buchanan is unquestionably an anti-Semite and a racist is problematic, however. As Michael E. Kinsley '72 pointed out about Buchanan recently, such labels carry such great moral weight that they should not be cheapened by arbitrary use--especially when clear proof of the label is lacking.

THE BUCHANAN CANDIDACY, in many ways, is the last gasp of a once-proud movement. Buchanan, by most definitions, represents what political observers call paleoconservatism, a movement otherwise in remission for four decades. Protectionism and isolationism were the hallmarks of this Old Right--tenets that are rejected by most Americans today. This is the movement for which Pat Buchanan is today's standard bearer.

Unfortunately for Buchanan, paleocon-servatism was dispatched by the rank-and-file of the Republican party 40 years ago. In 1952, Sen. Robert A. Taft, "Mr. Republican," met defeat at the hands of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Ike, of course, had spent the primary season in Europe as Supreme Allied Commander.

Discomfort with Taft's paleoconservatism, seen as discredited by the failure of high tariffs, the global implications of World War II and the formation of the Soviet Bloc, was strong enough to carry Ike to the nomination and eventual victory. While it is not true that this was the final defeat of paleoconservatives, Taft's failed candidacy was the closest such activists ever came to capturing the big prize in the postwar era.

While a superficial analysis could equate the Eisenhower "Eastern Establishment" coalition of 1952 to the Bush supporters of 1988/92, there is more to the story. Part of the Eisenhower coalition included a group that grew dissatisfied during the early 1960s, then openly revolted against anti-Vietnam sentiment and the Great Society.

Though this is an oversimplification, it was this movement of which Ronald Reagan became the champion and which carried Reagan to near-victory in 1976 and solid wins throughout the '80s. Bush retained enough of this constituency to win in '88 because he ran on the Right.

Now, however, it is this group that is disenchanted with the tax-raising, bigspending and rudderless administration it elected. Buchanan, of course, must capture this disgruntled group, these neoconservatives, if he hopes to score electoral victories against Bush. But he cannot for the simple fact that he is not one of them. Remember, Buchanan is a Old Right adherent.

Bush's apostasy separates him from this group as well. Still, Bush's incumbency, combined with the lack of a realistic alternative, will attract this support in the final analysis. Thus, while a hole for a conservative does exist, only a neoconservative, such as Housing Secretary Jack F. Kemp or former Education Secretary and Drug Czar William Bennett, could capitalize on the opportunity Bush's backsliding has created.

WHILE BUCHANAN cannot be expected to succeed electorally, this seeming failure must be qualified, for if success is measured by the triumph of ideas, rather than individuals, Buchanan will indeed win his battle with Bush. (Likewise, the real winner of the '92 election, at least as far as economic policy, will be Ronald Reagan.)

In 1972, conservative Republican Rep. John Ashbrook challenged Richard M. Nixon in the primaries. Ashbrook captured a measly 9.7 percent in New Hampshire, after which he dropped out of the race. But Ashbrook did not leave the race because of his poor showing--he left because Nixon agreed, explicitly or implicitly, to adopt the fundamental complaints Ashbrook had against the administration.

Buchanan will easily surpass Ashbrook's showing (the most recent Boston Globe polls give him approximately 29 percent). While no one should or could expect Bush to adopt a protectionist trade policy, Bush will be forced to the Right to recapture some of his lost support.

In the end, Buchanan will lose. By Super Tuesday at the latest, his candidacy will crash and burn. He will, however, succeed in pressuring the president back to the position from which he began and won the 1988 campaign--squarely on the (neocon-servative) Right.