As Clarence Thomas testified before the Senate this week, Harvard Law School professors watched carefully to see if the controversial top court appointee would take a position on, among other issues, natural law and the right of a woman to have an abortion.

If the past few Supreme Court hearings are any indication, many professors say, nominees who say too much are nixed, and those who don't say much of anything are appointed.

Still, Thomas's nomination is as volatile as any, reflected in the fact that many Law School professors refuse to air their opinions publicly.

Those who will talk, though, represent the entire spectrum of political thought, calling Thomas everything from perfectly competent to completely unqualified for the position.

"It seems to me he has not shown the kind of experience, insight, or ability that the position requires," says Pound Professor of Law James Vorenberg, who is also former dean. Vorenberg says that a qualified candidate must have had experience dealing with tough issues such as civil rights, civil liberties, race issues and abortion.

"I don't think he has much of a showing on this," he says.

Richard D. Parker, professor of law, disagrees.

"I think he's qualified," Parker says. "I don't have any doubt that he's right in there with a lot of respected Supreme Court justices."

Parker says that Thomas's behavior in the confirmation hearings was completely predictable, given the past misfortunes of those justice-could-have-beens who spoke too much.

"What's depressing is the obviousness with which someone nominated has to prevaricate and sand off any rough edges," Parker says.

Parker voices an opinion expressed by many other professors, that Supreme Court nominees simply should not voice their opinions before they are appointed.

"No one goes up and shoots themself in the foot," says Professor of Law Charles R. Nesson. Nesson says that it is "the way of the Supreme Court" that justices do not define their views and take a firm stance until after they are confirmed.

"It's conformism," says Parker. Parker cites Justice Rehnquist's appointment as the "first time I remember liberals saying that only people with mainstream views should be on the bench. It's not good in the long run."

Parker says that skirting the issues is not a new technique, citing Souter as the perfect example.

"If I were in the senate and I voted for Souter, I would have trouble voting against Thomas," he says.