Although it centers on a legal theory developed by one of America's most famous jurists, the senior thesis written by David H. Souter '61 offers precious little insight into the Supreme Court nominee's politics or judicial philosophy.

In the week since President Bush nominated Souter to succeed William J. Brennan on the high court, legal experts and journalists have been poring over Souter's writings to better understand what the 50-year-old judge thinks about pressing issues before the Court.

But Souter, who served on the New Hampshire Supreme Court until he was nominated and confirmed for the federal appeals bench nearly a year ago, mostly signed on to opinions written by other justices, leaving little in the way of a political paper trail.

Souter's senior thesis, submitted for honors at Harvard's Philosophy Department, would seem to be a more promising source of insight. The 48-page essay is titled "Holmes' Legal Position and the Criticism From a Current Position of Natural Law" is about legal theory and was written at a time when Souter did not expect anyone but his professors to agonize over it.

The promise, however, is deceptive. While Souter's thesis is about law, it is so abstract that it never once mentions a single case. And while Souter does stake out a few positions, he pointedly refuses to state his opinion on the largest and most significant question he raises.

Nonetheless, the thesis is telling in at least one respect--it strongly reflects the careful deliberation and organization that marks most of Souter's subsequent legal writing. During the course of the three-chapter paper,Souter orders his arguments almost as if writing amathematical proof, often pausing to repeat hisarguments before moving on.

In the thesis, Souter examines Holmes' theoryof legal positivism--a doctrine that holdsmorality and legality are not necessarilyentwined--and how it differs from theories ofnatural law.

Holmes' theory, as set in The Path ofLaw, holds that morality is not a sufficient,or even a necessary, condition for a law'sexistence. This, Souter explains, contradicts thetheory of natural law, which--through differentdefinitions of legality and morality that Holmesused--holds that laws are basically always moral.

To understand the debate, Souter examines keyphrases written by both sides, in effort to findboth consistencies and inconsistencies within eachtheory.

"Much of what I will say is an attempt atarticulating views which seem to me implied in[Holmes'] quoted statements, but which to myknowledge he never developed," Souter wrote.

Souter makes it clear from the outset that hewill not come down on either side of the argument,disqualifying himself from that task because he isnot a judicial expert.

"Since I am not a legal scholar, I cannot offera solution to the controversy," Souter wrote inthe introduction. "I have tried, rather, todescribe the alternatives which are open insetting what I believe to be the most importantpoint at issue."

As a result, Souter essentially says that boththeories are internally consistent, and decidesthat only future empirical scrutiny will tellwhich is more valid.

Souter's first chapter focuses on Holmes'conception of law. Souter says that Holmesbelieves laws are essentially prophecies of howfuture judges will interpret them. According toSouter, Holmes believes laws will serve as "guidesfor individual conduct of such a sort as to keepthe individual free from displeasing action of thecourts as they administer the law."

Souter argues that under such a definition, lawhas four major characteristics: wide promulgation,the need for explicit interpretation,non-retroactivity, and consistent enforcement.Since morality is not one of these, Souter argues,Holmes belief that legality and morality areseparate is internally consistent on a priorigrounds.