Before the opening of the Berlin Wall signalled an end to decades of oppression in Eastern Europe, the democracy movement in China once seemed the paradigm for effective peaceful protest against a totalitarian regime.

For a brief moment last spring, the "Goddess of Democracy" raised her lamp to illuminate the golden door of liberty. But that was before blood and fire stained Tiananmen Square.

The June 4, 1989, crackdown surprised and shocked the world. At the time it seemed almost incomprehensible that the government chose to massacre its own people, especially since millions of ordinary citizens had filled the streets of Beijing in the previous weeks to prevent the army from reaching the protesters.

One year later, though, there seems a certain inevitability to the events in Tiananmen Square. Looking back, the violent reaction appears as the only logical move the regime could have made. The Communist government that had gained its throne at the price of blood had made it clear that it would not flinch from killing to maintain its power.

Professor of Government Roderick MacFarquhar, who directs the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, describes Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping as a first-generation revolutionary who, like Cuba's Fidel Castro, will never voluntarily surrender power.

"He is fighting for the right of his cohort to lead China. He was not about to give up that right to a bunch of college students," MacFarquhar says. "Deng Xiaoping thought this was potentially a rerun of the Red Guard menace of the Cultural Revolution."

The crackdown was not surprising, MacFarquhar says, given the demands of the protesters for Deng's ouster. What was most unusual, he says, was that the protests continued for so long in defiance of Party orders. At the time the government tried to stamp out the demonstrations, but could not because of the tremendous outpouring of support for the students from the workers of Beijing.

MacFarquhar says it is highly significant that the government launched the actual attack at the democracy movement's weakest moment, when many people were asleep and after many students already had drifted out of Tiananmen Square.

"The difference between this and previous protest movements is this is the first time you see a strong protest movement rallying against a strong government for a period of several weeks," MacFarquhar says.

`Shreds of Legitimacy'

One year later, the political climate is still repressive, but the government has lost its former ability to maintain total control over Chinese society. Although the communist government's reputation eroded significantly during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s, never has its popularity been at such a low ebb, China scholars say.

"On June 4, 1989, the regime lost its last shreds of legitimacy," MacFarquhar says, "When the government ordered the army to turn its guns against its own people."

"There's really not a reign of terror, but this is not because of any goodwill on the part of the leadership," says Professor of Sociology Andrew G. Walder.

In the past, MacFarquhar says, campaigns of criticism forced people to turn against one another, and government criticism even pushed some to suicide. Since the massacre in Tiananmen, the government has lost its ability to control people merely through fear, MacFarquhar says. "They're going through the motions only because they don't want to be sent away to spend a nasty spell in prison," he explains.

MacFarquhar points out that many on the leadership's "most-wanted" list remain at large. "In the old days," he says, "the network of informers was so efficient that within 24 to 48 hours any fugitive would be arrested."

"The system for repression is not as effective," Walder says. "They're forced to use brute force and military force. The old methods aren't working."

A Crisis of Leadership

Consequently MacFarquhar predicts a major crisis of leadership and of succession within five years. He says Deng had to use up virtually all of his political capital to maintain control during the crisis, and that no one of Deng's stature is waiting in the wings to take a firm hold of the government after he dies.

The army was divided as to how to handle the Tiananmen protests, and MacFarquhar says military leaders are almost certainly still split. "When Deng Xiaoping dies, that essential lid on top of this boiling cauldron will be taken off," he says.

"The cities of China are a tinderbox," he adds. "Events in the cities can topple a government or threaten a government."

Even though 70 percent of the population lives in the countryside, most experts agree that only political events in urban areas really matter. One notable exception of this rule is the political takover of Mao Zedong--but MacFarquhar notes that it took him 22 years to mobilize enough support.

Deng's successors probably will be unable to maintain the systems of repression and will be forced to liberalize, experts say. Deng currently is trying to boost the credibility of those who support his economic reforms, in the hope that his plans will live on after his death.

"Hopefully Deng Xiaopeng will not die first and some of the hardliners will," says Merle Goldman, a professor of modern Chinese history at Boston University and a research associate at the Fairbank Center.

A Call For Moral Deunciation

Both President Bush and china experts maintain that the United States needs to maintain some ties with China, but many academics say the President is bending over backwards to accomodate the current leadership.

Immediately after the crackdown, international criticism of the communist government briefly made China something of a parish among nations. Among world figures, only Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania and Yassir Arafat of the Palestinian Liberation Organization expressed open support for the Chinese government.

But while Bush did admonish the Chinese government for the crackdown, many critics of the regime say he did not adequately express America's moral outrage.

Shortly after the crackdown, for example, the Australian prime minister gave a televised speech in which he tearfully denounced the regime. Walder says, "Morally, I would have liked [Bush] to have been harsher to the leadership."

Later, the press lambasted the President for sending his national security adviser, Brent Scow-croft, on two secret missions to foster better ties with the Chinese leadership. And most recently, while the President has said that the U.S. will not sell China any military equipment, he gave his strong support to a measure that would maintain China's current "most-favored-nation" trade status.

But Bush, a former ambassador to China who has reportedly taken a strong interest in forming U.S. policy there, maintains that keeping good relations with those in power will help pro-democracy forces in the long run.

MacFarquhar says Bush is giving the Chinese leadership almost everything it wants, but is getting practically nothing in return.

"I think the President has mishandled the China issue," MacFarquhar says, arguing that a clear statement of purpose and of moral outrage would have eliminated the perception on the part of the Chinese that America can be manipulated. The secret missions, he explains, have indicated that Bush "is prepared to do anything to maintain relations with China."

He adds that a Chinese diplomat recently defected to the U.S. and brought with him a document indicating that the Chinese leadership knows exactly how to manipulate American public opinion by timing releases of political prisoners.

Last month, while Congress was debating China's most-favored-nation status, China announced the release of 211 dissidents arrested during the crackdown. Since Bush announced his support for most-favored-nation status, new arrests have been reported. Observers say that those released are still under virtual house arrest.

Walder says most-favored-nation status should be made conditional on China's future human-rights behavior. He says, "I think they do respond to threats. I would like to see Bush be a little harsher."

Goldman points out that the United States is China's largest trading partner, with more than $8 billion total trade yearly if good shipped through Hong Kong to other destinations are taken into account. She says the U.S. should use those trade considerations to force political and human-rights concessions.

"This is not like under Mao. The Chinese government wants interaction with the United States," Goldman says. "If they lose most-favored-nation, they lose their low tariffs and their goods are no longer competitive in our markets."

But Walder says that many China Scholars are reluctant to cut too many ties, explaining that they do not want to curtail the excange of academic and cultural information. "The intellectuals I know in China are desperate to keep those links active," he says.

And MacFarquhar cautions that American pressure may have little effect on aging Chinese leaders who feel trapped by events beyond their control and whose sole ambition is to die while still holding the reigns of power.

Changes in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union have left china Almost without any potential allies, he says, adding that Ceausescu's ignominious end frightened China's leaders out of their wits. MacFarquhar says the leadership "sent Party investigators back into the military to make sure this didn't happen to them."

He adds that even if the U.S. does nothing, the hardliners cannot repress liberalizing forces indefinirely. "That kind of social power can be restrained, oppressed--but not forever."