IT is one of those maneuvers--like the Iran-Contra deal--which looks infallible on paper. The abduction of Sheik Abdul Karem Obeid could have proved a profitable and much needed bargaining chip for the release of Israeli soldiers taken captive by Hezbollah terrorists.

But, in the hours that followed, the mission proved short-sighted, even misguided. Israel should not be blamed for the apparent murder of U.S. Marine Lt. Col. William Higgins by terrorists, even though the execution was in retaliation for Obeid's abduction. There is no question about that. The question is, however, how Israel could have failed to realize that their mission would backfire as it did.

Imagine Israeli intelligence, the best and most experienced in the Middle East, planning the perfect scenario for Obeid's abduction. Even in its simplest form, their escapade seems far-fetched.

Part one: Enter Lebanon, and swiftly capture the terrorists.

Reality: Few military ventures succeed exactly as planned. While the plan calls for a quick kidnapping, no contingency apparently is made for the Lebanese neighbor who ventures out of his home to investigate and is fatally shot.

Part two: Barter with terrorists for an exchange of their hostages for yours.

Reality: Terrorists are the people who place bombs in the suitcases of their unsuspecting girlfriends. A death is a sacrifice to God. A dead brother is a martyr, not a victim. Bartering with terrorists constitutes either a bill too large to pay or a technique too unreliable upon which to depend.

Part three: The exchange occurs, and all is done.

Reality: To believe that we would all have lived happily ever after is pure fantasy. To survive, a terrorist must continually produce publicity, must keep other nations hostage to surprise and misfortune.

Part four: The world applauds Israel's courage and success.

Reality: Even if other nations were proud of Israels venture, public and international opinion would have kept them from applauding such a risky venture into Lebanon and terrorist diplomacy.

CLEARLY, the plan does not correspond to the reality. We are now left with the disturbing question of whether Israeli intelligence is completely unrealistic or smarter than we think.

Richard Ullman, a professor at Princeton University, recently wrote in The New York Times that "Israeli politics have been particularly in disarray; indeed, the events may have been a product of that disarray. It [Israel] has behaved as if under seige."

He is alluding to the intifada, the Palestinian uprising and the near civilwar between Arab and Jew, between Jew and Jew. An Israeli venture into Lebanon might have taken the spotlight off the impending negotiations for Palestinian elections.

Ullman speculates that the same short-sided combatitive force which is trying to end the intifada by submission and violence dictated Israel's Obeid fiasco. It failed, said Ullman, and has driven a "wedge between Israel and its friends."

This speculation points to domestic turmoil as the impetus for foreign adventure. But, Ullman and others fail to venture one step further.

Did it ever cross the mind of the people who run Israeli intelligence that something might go wrong? We have to believe yes. Is it too much then to ask whether, upon discovering possible faults in its plan, Israel knew that it was in a no-lose situation?

If the planned scenario were successful, Israel would have its soldiers back. If it were not successful, then the world would look in horror and dismay at the reaction of Arab terrorists. In a time when even the United States is demanding some sort of electoral concession to Palestinians, Israel could point to such Arab violence and say, "look, they cannot be trusted."

The Israelis were short-sided not because they believed that all would go as planned. Indeed, it is hard to believe that they expected all to go according to plans.

No, Israel was short-sided in believing that their hostages were the only ones who could die. Israel was bound to be the victim whether the Obeid trade-off succeeded or failed. Instead of saying, "look, those Arabs can not be trusted," many Americans are asking, "how could Israel not have known?"