FOR ANYONE WHO follows the news, Reagan and Gorbachev is of little use. At best, the book is a clear distillation of recent events in Soviet-American relations. At worst, it is a supermarket paperback masquerading as thoughtful analysis. Either way, the authors' "insights" would rarely startle a freshman Gov Jock.

Reagan and Gorbachev: The Chance for a Breakthrough in U.S.-Soviet Relations.

By Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott.

Vintage Books; 190 pp.; $5.95.

Indeed, Strobe Talbott, Time Magazine's Washington bureau chief, has co-written a work which probes little deeper than the magazine that employs him. But at least when Time articles grow wearisome, you can always turn to a bikini-clad beauty in the "People" section.

In some cases, Talbott and co-author Michael Mandelbaum's superficiality is reflected in a startling failure to substantiate even their simplest statements. The authors hardly support the easy conclusion that the Soviet-American rapprochement in the '70s failed because each nation sought unilateral advantages over the other.

On the Soviet side, they cite Brezhnev's support for communist revolutions in Indochina, the 1973 Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel, Cuban involvement in Angola and the Marxist coup in Afghanistan as examples of "unilateral" actions. And for the U.S.? Only America's exclusion of the Soviet Union from the Middle East peace process.

DOWNRIGHT SILLINESS also makes a cameo appearance in the book. Mandelbaum and Talbott portray the Administration's revocation of the Soviet ambassador's limousine privileges as a significant turning point in President Reagan's "counterrevolution" against detente. That's the only concrete example they give of the Administration's cool attitude toward the Soviets. Symbolism may be important, but surely the Administration has taken more significant actions than forcing the ambassador to enter the State Department by the main lobby.

Not until the second half of the book do the authors reach the heart of their argument and the most interesting material in their book. The Strategic Defense Initiative, they assert, is an impractical, useless project. Only its usefulness to various special interest groups keeps it alive: the Europeans crave the billion dollar high-tech defense contracts SDI will bring them; arms-controllers such as Paul Nitze want a billion dollar bargaining chip; and right-wingers led by Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle see it as a billion dollar way to violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and jettison the SALT agreements, and sabotage arms control. A useless Star Wars, they conclude, should be abandoned sooner rather than later.

Despite its validity, this analysis of SDI is unusually one-sided. Mandelbaum and Talbott ignore all arguments in favor of Star Wars. A defense system is conceivable, for instance, that would not constitute an impregnable "Astrodome"--to use the authors' inapt analogy--but might be capable of destroying a limited number of missiles launched accidentally by the Soviets or irresponsibly by a third power.

THOUGH TITLED Reagan and Gorbachev and boasting a picture on the cover of the two leaders discussing the fate of the world next to a cozy fireplace, the book lacks discussion of the 1985 Geneva summit and the 1986 Reykjek superpower get-together. It is ultimately about SDI. Mandelbaum and Talbott are guilty of trying to mask a one-sided condemnation of Star Wars in an even-handed discussion of Reagan and Gorbachev.

A more balanced tone reemerges in the final chapter. The best hope for improvement in Soviet-American relations, the authors write, lies in a reaffirmation of the SALT agreements limiting offensive and defensive weapons systems. But the U.S.'s relationship with the Soviet Union will never be friendly so long as the men in the Kremlin define security in terms of domestic and international coercion. Genuinely cordial Soviet-American relations rest on the unlikely assumption that Mikhail Gorbachev wants to liberalize the Eastern bloc and the even more remote possibility that the General Secretary can liberalize the Eastern bloc.