THE RATIONALE was a familiar one.

As the contingent of U.S. bombers, minus one, screamed homeward from Libya, the Reagan Administration invoked the axiom that has dominated national security doctrine since Chamberlain proclaimed "peace in our time."

"We must call attention once again to that age-old lesson: that appeasement of aggression does not pay. We have to stand up to these things," Secretary of State George P. Shultz declared. We must address the aggressor in terms he can respect and change his mind. Force is the antidote to aggression.

And across the Capital, Speaker of the House Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill Jr. echoed the rhetoric. We must teach Moammar Khadafy a lesson. Fight fire with brimstone.

The emphasis is on deterrence. The argument is simple and compelling, almost visceral. But the lesson postwar policy makers have extracted from the 1930s is more an article of faith than a clear interpretation of unambiguous facts. And it is misapplied in the war against terrorism.

Historical experience lends appeasement little credence. However it does not follow that blunt demonstrations of force invariably prove more persuasive. Allied resistance, when it came, did not cause Adolf Hitler to retreat. Years later, demonstrated U.S. resolve did not stem the tide in Southeast Asia. The decisiveness of conventional force rested on its material effect, not its deterrent quality.

Now, the "age-old lesson" is said to guide U.S. policy in a different time and place, against a different form of aggression. In the war against terrorism, faith in deterrence is delusion. Judging from his history, Moammar Khadafy will not be intimidated. The greater likelihood is that waving the mailed Western fist over Libya will inflame anti-American passions and inspire an escalation of Arab terrorism. Where the populace perceives America as the evil aggressor, civilian casualties and piles of rubble only confirm the hostility.

The U.S. air strike against Khadafy's "terrorist infrastructure" may have impaired his ability to export violence, in which case it will have been a limited success. But if the attack failed to cripple him, it will prove self-defeating.

And even if the U.S. air raid struck at the heart of Khadafy's operation, it did not strike at the heart of the problem: the seething regional resentment that manifests itself in airports, embassies, and night clubs around the world.

THE EPISODE underscores the enormity of our Catch-22. The terrorist threat is an amorphous, elusive one that leaves us few opportunities to fight back. When concrete targets avail themselves, the U.S. should strike, although in striking, we risk incurring reprisals that we are almost powerless to prevent.

Reagan's bombing raid is easy to understand, difficult to condemn. This country cannot complacently ignore a smoking gun. Nevertheless, it should respond with a discreet and realistic objective: eliminating a tangible threat. The stated aim of educating our adversary--"teaching Khadafy a lesson"--is a misguided one that encourages indiscriminate and self-defeating actions.

The effective use of force may weaken Khadafy, but we should not rely on the symbolic show of strength to subdue him.