This article is the first installment of a regular feature on the editorial page of The Crimson, "Commentary," which will provide a forum for opinion from members of the Harvard community. Those interested in contributing pieces to "Commentary" should contact the Editorial Chairman.

WHO WON AND who lost at Reykjavik? My initial reaction was that we both, Americans and Soviets, lost. What had started out as a preparatory discussion quickly turned into a historic opportunity with unprecedented proposals being submitted by both sides. Negotiators from both the United States and the Soviet Union, who had held firmly and unblinkingly to positions for years, if not decades, found themselves caught up in a strange dynamic that held the potential for eliminating nuclear weapons, both intermediate and long-range, within a decade.

The realization that such an all-encompassing proposal had been considered and then rejected because of President Ronald Reagan's refusal to agree to ban testing and development of his Strategic Defense Initiative weapons system came as an enormous disappointment for those of us who were following the proceedings. To see President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev so warm and cordial with one another at lunch, and so dejected and grim-faced only a few hours later, reflected their, as well as our, sorrow at what almost had been in our grasp.

Moreover, when would we find ourselves again with two leaders better equiped to implement such a far reaching proposal. Gorbachev more than any other recent Soviet leader has been willing to try radical ideas, and Reagan is a President who need not fear an attack from his right wing.

It seemed inevitable that the sudden collapse of the talks should be followed by an all-out effort to place the blame on the other side. In the past, such failures have been accompanied by bitter accusations and unseemly language which often generates its own dynamic and makes it harder to resume relations in a calmer atmosphere. That did not happen this time, however. Both Reagan and Gorbachev have responded with moderation. Larry Speakes, the White House press spokesman, went so far as to compliment Gorbachev on his speech of October 14.

What has been even more hopeful, however, is that there were some initial indications that all was not lost and that some of the proposals might yet be salvaged. Victor Karpov, one of the chief Soviet arms negotiators, has indicated that the Soviet Union was prepared to move ahead with the proposal to destroy all intermediate missile warheads and launchers and leave only 100 in Asia and another 100 in the United States. Unfortunately other Soviet officials have since become more skeptical about such decoupling, but certainly there is reason to be considerably more optimistic about the prospects for the future than seemed to be the case the day the meeting ended. There are even hints that Gorbachev might be willing to meet with Reagan at a Washington summit in 1987.

What accounts for Reagan's and Gorbachev's behavior? It would be presumptuous for any outsider to speak definitively for either man. Some have suggested that Reagan's flexibility reflects his desire to add an arms control agreement to what he sees as a record of domestic accomplishments. Others, particularly conservatives, add that Nancy Reagan and George Shultz, who also want an arms agreement, have assumed undue influence over Reagan.

It is Gorbachev, however, whose actions have provoked special interest. There is good reason to believe that he is particularly determined to reach some kind of arms control agreement as soon as he possibly can. Some have argued that if he has trouble with Reagan over SDI, he will simply wait another two and a quarter years for the next American President and see if the new President will be amenable to giving up SDI. While that may be the case, Gorbachev seems unwilling to wait. He seems to want an arms agreement, all-encompassing if he can get one, as soon as he can.

The explanation, if there is one, is that Gorbachev has made economic reform his number one priority, but without a substantial reduction in military expenditures, his efforts will come to nought. There is good reason to believe that even with a reduction of Soviet military expenditures, which presently account for 14 to 16 percent of the Soviet GNP, Gorbachev will not be able to generate the far-reaching structural reforms he seeks. But with arms reduction, he at least stands a better chance.

It may be that Gorbachev has learned something from Deng Xiaoping, who had a similar problem when he assumed leadership in China. China's military expenditures were over 13 percent in 1973. Deng has managed to reduce them so that today they stand at about 6 to 8 percent of the GNP. He just demobilized one million troops, 20 percent of the Chinese army. Such actions have made it possible for him to divert resources that used to go to military expenditures and heavy industry and send them instead to light industry and consumer goods. In appreciation, the workers and peasants are now working harder and more productively, and innovation in China has radically improved.

Gorbachev is attempting something similar. He has already told his generals that their new weapons systems have been costing too much and that in the future they will be given less to spend. Like their American counterparts, the generals have not taken such news kindly. It is no fun being a general without soldiers and weapons to parade around.

Some of the generals have been openly critical of Gorbachev's anti-military moves. An official Soviet commentator, Aleksandr Bovin, publicly acknowledged on Soviet television that Soviet "military comrades" were unhappy about some of Gorbachev's actions, particularly his decision to ban nuclear testing. They worry that the United States will have had a year and a quarter of additional testing while Gorbachev has held the Soviet Union back.

This is not to insist that Gorbachev should fear a coup by his generals and other hard-line conservatives. But even Gorbachev can go only so far. Some American observers dispute that. As they point out, all too often in the past there have been rumors that Americans should be more flexible in their policies towards the Soviet Union because one Soviet leader or another found himself in difficulty. There were even such rumors about Stalin. Yet the fact remains that there were similar rumors about Krushchev just before he was deposed.

I do not worry about any coup against Gorbachev. But at the same time, I do worry that we in the United States may have lost a historic opportunity to eliminate nuclear weapons on a scale previously unimagined, in order to hold out for an SDI program the effectiveness of which is questionable. We should look again at the offer. Just because Gorbachev is associated with the proposal does not mean that it is a trick. He has his own needs and pressures and it may well be that the cost of holding out for SDI is not worth the cost of forsaking the proposals which came so close to being accepted in Iceland.

Marshall I. Goldman is the associate director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, and a professor of economics at Wellesley College. He is the author of many books on the Soviet Union, the most recent of which is the forthcoming Gorbachev's Challenge: Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology to be published by W. W. Norton for release in the Spring of 1987.